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CURRENT History

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In this seven-article study, the strengths and weaknesses of African states are explored. Our introductory article discusses inter-African foreign policy, United States policies in Africa and the role of the O.A.U., concluding that, "Clearly, African unity is fragile." Nonetheless, "If unity could be fostered or if new, more powerful, groupings developed, Africans would be in an even better position to resist external pressures and conduct more independent foreign policies."

Africa in the World Arena

By KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Associate Professor of Political Science, Western Reserve University

FOR MOST OF the world's new states, foreign policy is of secondary importance. Of necessity domestic considerations take precedence. Although the foreign policies of the new states of Africa cannot be understood exclusively in terms of internal affairs, they cannot be understood at all if the internal milieu is ignored. This is not strictly a characteristic of new states, but, with them, its manifestations are more obvious. First, the fragility of the new states and nations is all too evident. They lack historical sanction; their legitimacy is constantly brought into question; their future existence is subject to doubt. Moreover, the governments are even more tenuous than the states themselves.

In such a context, foreign policy serves numerous purposes. It can be a cohesive ele-

ment projecting preindependence movements into postcolonial times, thus preserving the fragile unity forged in the anticolonial struggle. It can accentuate the identity of the state in a community of nation-states. It can enhance the prestige of the national leader at home and reduce the effectiveness of his opposition. It can be used as a rationale for repressive domestic policies. It can help the struggle for greater independence and economic development and thereby reduce foreign influences on its domestic life.

The chief foreign policy concern of Africa has been, and is, the anticolonial struggle.¹ East-West competition touches on this issue, but to Africans it is not their primary interest. In short, the cold war is important to African governments only to the extent that it affects and can be used for their own ends—the prompt elimination of colonial and settler governments in Africa and the economic and political development of their states.

Still, from an American perspective, there is some utility in viewing Africa in a East-West framework. This, after all, has been the chief tenet of United States international

¹ A few of the more recent studies of Africa's international policies are: Vernon McKay (ed.), *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Doudou Thiam, *The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1965); and, I. William Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

policy for over 20 years and it still serves as a touchstone of popular and official international discussion. If such a view somewhat distorts reality, if it imputes to Africans goals and policies they never intended, that is our error. It is not entirely fortuitous that Africa entered the international community during the East-West rivalry;² the modified cold war offers Africa's statesmen promise as well as problems.

Since the famous Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, the dominant governmental attitude of the independent African states toward the Western and communist alliance systems has been one of nonalignment.³ Although there have been different varieties and interpretations of the concept, it represents for the nonwhite, non-Western, ex-colonial states of Africa and Asia a common approach to the dangers of a world divided into two inexorably hostile camps—or so it seemed in the 1950's. Their chief objectives have been to achieve legal independence and to solidify economic and political independence.

In spite of the different policy interpretations of nonalignment, there has been an underlying consensus among its proponents regarding its basic tenets. Disagreement seems to arise about matters of ideological orientation and subsequent policy decisions. For example, there is common agreement that, although they wish to be nonaligned, the African states are not neutral, not insensitive, to the moral issues involved in the East-West conflict. Nonalignment does not

mean that they are detached, uncommitted, unwilling to take sides in what they regard to be matters of ethical import. African neutralists see no virtue in steering a middle course equidistant between East and West. Rather, they have values and they are fully prepared to take sides on given issues. They merely wish to maintain diplomatic maneuverability and freedom of choice.

What they want is not so much nonalignment for its own sake, but nonalignment because it facilitates and is a manifestation of the political freedom a truly sovereign and independent state expects. If, as a matter of choice arising out of several live alternatives, a professedly nonaligned state's policy should happen to coincide closely with one or the other of the cold war rivals, then that state would probably maintain that it was still fundamentally nonaligned. While free choice for economically and militarily weak and dependent states may be an ideal rather than a reality, its impact as a goal for which they strive cannot be emphasized too much.⁴ What the advocates of nonalignment oppose is *permanent* or *obligatory* diplomatic and military identification with the great powers.

The themes and the statements about nonalignment by leaders of the different African states may have much in common. But their actual relations with the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the former metropolises do not. One recent study attempts to devise a technique to measure alignment and to validate the measurements by polling a selection of area specialists and international relations generalists.⁵ Each was asked to rank 119 countries on an alignment scale. Alignment scores indicated that, of any geographical area, Africa ranked farthest from the United States. Yet it still fell about half-way between two designations: "neutral with leanings toward U.S.," and "neutral or aligned with third party." No African state fell among the 20 states regarded as most aligned with the United States. On the other hand, six were numbered among those closest to the Soviet Union: Zanzibar, Ghana, Rwanda, United Arab Republic, Algeria and Guinea. Significantly, if in the African framework

² For example, Ferhat Abbas, a former Algerian political leader, wrote in his book, *La Nuit coloniale*: "Without the existence and power of the socialist world, we would still be at the stage of colonialist literature and wordy promises of Woodrow Wilson."

³ Two excellent volumes on this subject are: Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutrality and Non-alignment: The New States in World Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1962); and, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

⁴ President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania discusses the practical problems of such a policy in: "The Costs of Nonalignment," *Africa Report*, XI, No. 7 (October, 1966), pp. 61-67.

⁵ Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, "Measuring International Alignment," *Orbis*, IX, No. 1 (Spring, 1965), pp. 171-189.

one is searching for ties with the West, France and not the United States serves as the pole of attraction for states such as Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger and Togo.

The alignment scores (although not the techniques) have been somewhat outdated by developments in Africa. The coups in Algeria (June 19, 1965) and Ghana (February 24, 1966) have removed these states from the Russian sphere of influence. The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika (April 23, 1964) withdrew Zanzibar as an autonomous actor in international politics, although the union coincided with President Julius Nyerere's increasing criticisms of the West, particularly the United States. Mali continues to present an image of hostility to the West—one occasionally in accord with communist positions—although in actual policy it is more circumspect and appears to be genuinely nonaligned. Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi have evidenced a close attachment to the Chinese People's Republic. What this means is that Africa is still extremely fluid. Changes in government and single events can alter postures that have not had an opportunity to harden.

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

American participation in the Stanleyville rescue of November, 1964, stands as a landmark in United States-African relations. On the surface this action in the Congo (Leopoldville)—now known as Kinshasa—could be regarded as the nadir of American policy in Africa.⁶ The generally favorable image fostered by foreign assistance and the sympa-

thetic policy of the Kennedy administration was shattered by American-British-Belgian cooperation in an overtly military operation. Throughout the continent, radical and moderate governments joined the chorus of condemnation, which lasted well into 1965.

Washington's unfortunate identification with and support of the Moïse Tshombe regime in the Congo beginning in July, 1964, preceded the Stanleyville rescue. United States relations with several of the Congo's neighbors, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan and Tanzania, took a turn for the worse. Each of these states gave encouragement, sanctuary, and material assistance to the Stanleyville rebel government. Thus, their policies clashed with the aims and activities of the United States. In each state, United States charges of outside interference in Congolese domestic affairs precipitated their countercharges of United States meddling in their internal affairs.

The present status of relations with the Sudan is good; with Tanzania, strained; with Congo (Brazzaville), poor. In August, 1965, the United States withdrew its diplomatic and consular representatives from Brazzaville, because of apparently calculated harassment, and normal representation has not been resumed.

The Tanzanian situation is a little more complicated. On November 12, 1964, Tanzanian Minister of External Affairs Oscar Kambona denounced an alleged plot to subvert his government. Photostats of three letters were published in the ruling party press purporting to show that the United States had plotted with Great Britain to use Portuguese and South African mercenaries to attack strategic points in Tanzania. The United States ambassador immediately denied the charges and labelled the documents "clumsy forgeries." Later, the Tanzanian government turned them over to the United States embassy whose experts scrutinized them and concurred in the ambassador's appraisal. This was followed by the expulsion of two American diplomats in January, 1965. They had been accused of "subversive activities," in this instance a case of mistaken interpretation of

⁶ See Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Stanleyville Rescue: American Policy in the Congo," *The Yale Review*, LVI, No. 2 (Winter, 1967), pp. 242-255. In 1965 former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams virtually admitted that the rescue mission was unfortunate when he told a congressional committee: "I think our big problem at the moment is the cloud we are under because of the Congo operations. I think up until 6 or 8 months ago the prestige of the United States was very high in Africa." U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1965: Hearings*, Part I. 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 121 and also 131 ff. In 1966, Stanleyville became known as Kisangani.

a monitored telephone conversation. After American denials, Washington countered by expelling a Tanzanian diplomat. Ultimately, both governments recalled their ambassadors.

Although the Tanzanian government never did issue an explanation of the initial charges or join with the United States in an examination of the facts, neither side wished to see the situation worsen. President Nyerere was not entirely in agreement with his foreign minister and sought an improvement in relations. The American ambassador returned to Dar es Salaam by June, 1965, and the Tanzanian embassy in Washington was reopened in October.

Thus, in Africa, the United States sometimes finds itself regarded as a status quo (and sometimes reactionary) force too closely identified with the colonial and ex-colonial and the white settler regimes, and in some instances (and with some justification) of trying to fill the vacuum left by the departing European colonialists. On the other hand, there are other countries where the United States has seen an encouraging improvement in relations, largely because of domestic changes, or Chinese Communist or Soviet Union blunders. Kenya, Ghana and Algeria come to mind. The recent military coups in Algeria and Ghana were greeted with relief in Washington. In the past the United States usually waited several weeks before recogniz-

ing new military governments, to avoid the impression that it was encouraging or was involved in military coups. In the case of Ghana the United States waited only one week.⁷

What stands out, however, is the overall decline of official American interest in Africa and an increasing willingness to let Africans solve their own problems, provided there is no interference from other "radical" states either in Africa or abroad. Over the past two or three years the United States has become preoccupied with the war in Vietnam. As a result, African problems (with the exception of headline issues and a growing business investment in selected areas) have been avoided or ignored. United States economic assistance to Africa has declined steadily since 1962.⁸ Likewise, congressional interest and time devoted to Africa has diminished since about the same time. Moreover, in recent sessions, Congress has grown increasingly critical of black Africa and more sympathetic to settler Africa. Chances are this tendency will continue in the 90th Congress.⁹ Crudely put, Africa is not central to the concerns of American policy-makers and congressmen.

THE COMMUNIST WORLD AND AFRICA

At a time when United States involvement in African affairs seems to be lessening, Soviet and Chinese involvement is likewise changing.¹⁰ Apparently, the Soviet Union is in the process of rethinking its role in Africa. Aid from Soviet bloc countries has not increased lately, and in states where they formerly exercised considerable influence (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali), some communists have been asked to leave and others have voluntarily diminished their presence. The Soviet Union did not fare especially well in Guinea during the period of her greatest concentration of effort and money (1958-1962), nor did its close ties with other states pay the kind of political dividends her leaders had come to expect. From a Soviet standpoint Africans have become unmanageable—more independent, more perceptive, and more sensitive than originally supposed. The result has been a lot of talk from the Kremlin re-

⁷ See the speech by the present Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, II: "U.S. Role in a Changing Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, LIV, No. 1406 (June 6, 1966), pp. 898-899.

⁸ Darrell Randall, "U.S. Aid in Africa," *Current History*, LI, No. 299 (July, 1966), pp. 20-27. Note also the "Clay Report," esp. p. 9 where it is argued that U.S. aid to Africa should be reduced because our "immediate security interests" are less evident in Africa than elsewhere. *Report to the President of the United States from the Committee to Strengthen the Free World* (Washington: GPO, 1963).

⁹ See the special issue of *Africa Today*, XIV No. 1 (January, 1967) which is devoted to "Africa in American Politics"; particularly Congressman Donald M. Fraser, "The Inert Congressional Watchdog," and Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Congressional Image of Africa."

¹⁰ For background see: Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); and, Fritz Schatten, *Communism in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

cently, but not much real revolutionary activity in Africa proper. The Soviet Union seems to have shifted gears, emphasizing diplomacy and normal channels of contact rather than subversion and ideological purity.

One obvious problem confronting the Soviet Union has been the military coups in Algeria and Ghana. The other military coups in Africa fit rather easily into the framework of the Soviet conception of neocolonialism and popular unrest in nominally independent states. But in Soviet parlance, Ghana and Algeria—along with Guinea, Mali, and the U.A.R.—were closest to being “progressive,” antiimperialist, antifeudalist, and noncapitalist “national democracies.” In spite of hints in the Russian press about “imperialist agents” behind the coups, the comparative ease of takeover has led the Soviets to realize that the regimes they backed were not so popular as previously supposed. In discussions of Africa and the third world at the 23d Party Congress in March, 1966, speakers seemed to indicate that the U.S.S.R. was truly upset by the turn of events in Ghana. As a result of the ensuing confusion, a decline in doctrinal pronouncement on Africa is discernible. Soviet spokesmen are now forced to develop a more flexible and pragmatic substitute for what has proven to be the bankrupt doctrine of “national democracy.”¹¹

There are several possible explanations for these changes. It may be that Chinese and American influence in Africa has fallen off, thus making it possible for the Russians to cut back without losing touch. After all, they have constructed a rather solid diplomatic base in Africa over the years. It may be that the Africans are becoming more wary of Soviet techniques and propaganda. Perhaps the Soviets are genuinely perplexed as to how to approach Africa, and they may have decided to temporize and study the matter, hop-

ing their rivals may stumble and fall, enabling them to step in effectively. An October, 1965, article from *Pravda* warns of this frustration when it suggests that “The best way to fulfill our internationalist duty to the working people of the entire world is the successful construction of socialism and communism.”¹² Although this by no means presages a voluntary isolation of the Soviet Union in the world, it does smack of Joseph Stalin’s “socialism in one country” and the international implications of that policy. Whatever the reasons, it appears that the Soviet Union is undergoing some serious rethinking on the whole problem of how best to promote its interests in the underdeveloped world.

Lately, Africa’s politicians have been even less hospitable to Chinese Communists than to Americans or Russians.¹³ Chinese Premier Chou En-lai’s often quoted remark that “Africa is ripe for revolution” has come to haunt him. Yet this slogan fits easily into China’s overall view of Africa in the world revolution. To the Chinese, legal independence does not necessarily mean that a state enjoys real political and economic independence. Africa, like China before it, must be prepared for a long struggle. Contemporary Africa, thus, can be compared to China in the early twentieth century. Some African states are relatively free from foreign influence, and some are effectively ruled from abroad. It is, therefore, neocolonialism and its vanguard, the United States, that must be eliminated from Africa. The protracted revolution is to follow the format of Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao’s 1965 article on the struggle between the “world countryside” (the underdeveloped states) and the “world cities” (the “have” countries). To this end, the Chinese have trained guerrillas, bribed politicians, set up front organizations, extended some foreign aid and entertained students and statesmen from Africa. A mark of China’s success was that, by 1965, 18 of 36 African states had extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese People’s Republic (C.P.R.). But the Chinese are learning, as did the Americans and Russians, that Africans will not easily surrender independence.

¹¹ For more detail see: Charles B. McLane, “Soviet Doctrine and the Military Coups in Africa,” *International Journal*, XXI, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), pp. 298–310.

¹² As quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 309–310.

¹³ George T. Yu, “China’s Failure in Africa,” *Asian Survey*, VI, No. 8 (August, 1966), pp. 461–468.

When Chou En-Lai first visited Africa (December, 1963, to February, 1964), China's prospects in Africa looked good. But recently it seems to have lost some of its appeal. Events involving Africa, both internal and international, have been strongly unfavorable to China's cause. In Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, and Tanzania, it has seen its presence decline. The only country where the C.P.R. appears to have gained markedly in influence is Congo (Brazzaville). Although, for Africa's revolutionaries, China is still the shining standard for a peasant-based revolution, revolutionary Africans are themselves losing favor and influence. The indefinite postponement of the Asian-African Conference scheduled for August, 1965, in Algiers was an additional blow to Peking's penetration in Africa.

Africa's statesmen, seemingly, began to realize that a call to revolution for Africa's masses would be directed at *their* own governments. China's recent failures (and this is by no means an irreversible trend) can be attributed to the basic incompatibility between China's foreign policy objectives (and particularly its conception of the fundamentals of the protracted world revolution) and the interests and aspirations of Africa's governing elites.

AFRICAN UNITY: IDEAL AND REALITY

African unity is closely related to nonalignment. At its base is a desire to assure the independence of Africa and to extend Africa's influence in world affairs. By uniting the continent, Africans see economic advantage, greater security, more prestige, and increased opportunity to transform international power

relationships. The basic question regarding African unity is not, "Shall we have unity?" but rather, "How shall unity be brought about and how rapidly?" A question deferred until later but embedded in all discussions is, "Who shall lead a united Africa?"

Virtually every African politician has repeatedly asserted his devotion to the ideal of Pan-African unity.¹⁴ At the crux of the debate are the mechanics and extent of unification. There are two major approaches: one is political, the other is economic. Versions of these approaches differ as to geographical coverage—continental, sub-Saharan, or regional. But central to each is the unchallengeable fact that, before unity can be achieved, those in positions of authority must be convinced that their interests will be served by radically altering the established patterns of intra-African relations. So far, there has been no indication that a concerted willingness to change exists, despite the almost constant demand for greater cooperation and unity.

Although the climate of sentiment sympathetic to demands for unity appears to have existed prior to the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana—once the chief spokesman for continent-wide political unification—the leaders of most states, for many reasons, have not made the sacrifices necessary to achieve unity. The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) does not appear to constitute the kind of unity which Africans advocate. Some would contend that Nkrumah's overthrow will make unity more difficult; others that with Nkrumah out of the picture the reluctance to unify will disappear.¹⁵ Unity is still a long way off, and for those wary of broad-ranging unification schemes, Nkrumah's presence or absence makes little difference.

Regardless of personalities, unity opens a Pandora's box of imponderables. The recent history of the O.A.U. illustrates these ongoing problems. Temporarily at least, ideological and personal animosities were overcome and the general aura of compromise and cooperation was institutionalized when the O.A.U. was created at Addis Ababa in

¹⁴ Particularly useful here are: Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (Rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1965); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); and, Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

¹⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, "African Unity Re-assessed," *Africa Report*, XI, No. 4 (April, 1966), pp. 41-46.

1963.¹⁶ The critical issues which had divided the Casablanca and Monrovia groups¹⁷—the independence of Algeria and the civil war in the Congo—had been settled (the latter superficially) so that differences could be papered over. Intra-African relations were never again to be quite the same. When the old rivalries reemerged, they were subsumed under the institutional framework of the O.A.U. Still, the survival of the O.A.U. was in question.

Before the second O.A.U. summit could convene in Cairo in mid-July, 1964, the Congo crisis flared again and schisms so near the surface opened. In July, 1964, Moïse Tshombe was named prime minister of the Congo (Kinshasa) and was promptly banned from attending the Cairo summit. The fighting in the Congo's eastern provinces grew in intensity. One group of states claimed its duty was to assist the rebels in the name of antineocolonialism. Another group rejected subversion and external (although African) interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Algeria, Ghana and the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) once again openly sought the destruction of an African government that they regarded as neocolonialist. In retaliation, the four "moderate" French-speaking states (led by Ivory Coast) created the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (O.C.A.M.) early in 1965, to thwart subversive activities and to reintegrate the Congolese government into African diplomatic life. Africa once more was rent by fundamental ideological divisions.

These became evident at the October, 1965, O.A.U. summit meeting in Accra. For some time preceding the conference there was a question whether or not it would be convened. Although the Congo rebellion had been subdued but not extinguished, several heads of state maintained that as long as

Nkrumah harbored political refugees from their countries and trained them in subversion, they would not go to Accra.¹⁸ Consequently, eight states were unrepresented at Accra—the O.C.A.M. four (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta), plus Chad, Gabon, Malagasy and Togo. The Accra summit, though unproductive, was not a total loss. The Congo issue no longer plagued the O.A.U. (President Joseph Kasavubu had dismissed Tshombe one week earlier). Instead, the Rhodesian crisis helped supply a sense of urgency and cooperation. Not knowing precisely what course the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith would take, the heads of state found little difficulty reaching agreement condemning a possible unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.). The resolution represented a victory for the "moderates." Despite the absence of the main complainants, the heads of state also agreed "not to tolerate . . . any subversion originating in our countries against another Member State" of the O.A.U.

As for Nkrumah's advocacy of union government, consideration of his toned-down proposal to create an executive council as the "executive arm" for the heads-of-state assembly was postponed until the meeting scheduled for 1966 in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie offered a substitute resolution to establish a committee to study Nkrumah's proposal and, although it received 18 votes for to 5 against, it failed to get the requisite 24 votes (two-thirds of the members) to carry.

Despite these difficulties, there are some who believe that the Accra summit "strengthened" (Continued on page 180)

¹⁶ See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter," *International Conciliation*, No. 546 (January, 1964).

¹⁷ For a list of members of these groups, see Vernon McKay, "Cooperation for Order in Africa," *Current History* (March, 1966), footnote 2, p. 131.

¹⁸ The Ghana government has documented these activities in *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa* (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1966).

Kenneth W. Grundy has been interested in the foreign policies of the emerging states for some time. His articles dealing with African politics, ideologies and international relations have appeared in professional and popular journals in the United States and abroad. He is a coauthor of *African Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

"A number of factors have contributed to the development of a broad community of interests between the Arab North and sub-Saharan Africa," comments this observer, who notes that "In a harsh and demanding world, the Maghreb [has] looked southward for nations sharing similar interests and aspirations."

Trends in North Africa

By WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Associate Professor of Political Science, George Washington University

CENTURIES AGO, the Chinese thinker Mencius was queried as to the best tactics for the preservation of a petty kingdom's territorial integrity. He is reputed to have counseled: "Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your people." This prudent advice proved efficacious for more than a thousand years. However, man's political and economic needs, as well as his expanding technology, have increasingly bridged the moats and breached the walls so long isolating various peoples from one another.

Within recent years, North Africa has escaped its former isolation and has begun to fashion various bonds with sub-Saharan Africa. These ties reflect the basic reality of the middle decades of the twentieth century—survival for small states is vouchsafed through networks of interdependence rather than by territorial insularity.

Until recently, a number of factors and forces have impeded the development of communities of interest between North Africa (frequently referred to as the Maghreb) and the African states to the south. The Maghrebian states—Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia—are Arab, Islamic and, on the whole, oriented toward the Mediterranean—whereas sub-Saharan Africa embraces a melange of cultures, races, ethnic communities and religious groups. European imperium tended to accentuate these divisions and to loosen the once considerable economic bonds

that existed between North Africa and the sub-Saharan area. Whereas the Maghreb had served as a zone of passage for a substantial carrying trade between the western Sudan and Europe, this economic activity virtually disappeared after the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, European rule resulted in the creation of frontiers between the two areas—in the form of territorially encapsulated nation-states—where none had existed previously.

Even before the arrival of the Europeans, relationships had been skewed by the sense of cultural and racial superiority frequently manifested by Arabs toward their African neighbors. Some traces still exist. As recently as 1954, United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser exhibited such feelings as he outlined a new role for Egypt in the African continent:

Can we ignore that there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us? . . . It is not in vain that our country has, in the North-east of Africa, a position from which it overlooks the dark continent. . . . The people of Africa will look to us—we who are the guardians of the continent's northern gates, who constitute the connecting link between the continent and the outer world. . . .

This slightly egocentric perspective undoubtedly disturbed some African sensibilities at the time. Nor could Africans be reassured by the appearance of a map in a 1959 issue of the *Arab World* depicting the Arab domain

as including Chad, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and a significant portion of Niger.

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to assume that Egyptian efforts to form constructive ties with African communities south of the Sahara were all doomed to failure. Cairo has served as a major pole of attraction for the continent's 120 million Muslims. For progressive Muslims, the vaunted rejuvenation of al-Azhar University in Cairo in the mid-1950's proved instructive and inspirational—particularly for those West African Muslims seeking precedents for their own reformist programs. The Nasser government also recognized the advantages to be derived from Muslim solidarity, organizing a world-wide Islamic congress—with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—in 1953, headquartered in Cairo.

In addition, the Egyptian government had other weapons in its arsenal. The proliferation of nationalist and liberation movements in Africa afforded Cairo an opportunity to play a major role as political agent, arms supplier and financial supporter. By 1958, representatives of political organizations from the Cameroun, Niger, Eritrea, Kenya and Mali were comfortably ensconced in Cairo, where they enjoyed Egyptian patrimony and political guidance. The headquartering in Cairo of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization—an umbrella for several political groups of an extremist character—also served to enhance Egyptian influence until the organization's decline after 1962.

Egyptian influence foundered, however, on the shoals of African nationalism. Having succeeded in divesting themselves of European colonial domination, Africa's emerging leaders were not prepared to welcome other intrusive forces or influences. Integration and development at home were their principal concerns, and foreign relations and attachments were treated, initially at least, as an extension of domestic imperatives. Loyalty to central authority was intermittent

at best among the medley of peoples within the new states; bureaucratic skills were largely untested; and limited human and physical resources impeded the formation of viable institutions in most of the new states. Within this context, it was felt that foreign ideologies, attachments and alliances could only confuse, divide and further dilute popular loyalties.

Within the African states, power perforce meant state power. Ideology was the domain of the ruling party. Foreign policy was to serve as the means for authenticating statehood and expanding national consciousness. Few leaders were prepared to cast away sovereignty or political power for such ill-defined causes as Afro-Asian solidarity, African union or Islamic unity. Most sought for their states "an uninhibited voice, an independent role, and a sense of uniqueness."

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

As other North African states acquired independence,¹ Arab relations with sub-Saharan Africa assumed new dimensions and forms. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were attracted to other regions as well—particularly to the Arab East and West Europe—because of previous cultural ties and the need for foreign technical assistance and investment. However, the establishment of intimate relationships with states outside Africa was precluded by a host of interrelated factors: (1) the continuation of the Algerian struggle for independence exacerbated Moroccan and Tunisian diplomatic relations with France from 1956 to mid-1962; (2) this irritant proved to be only one of several as President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and King Mohamed V of Morocco sought to speed the postindependence decolonization of their countries; (3) disagreements with France erupted over the continued presence of French troops on Moroccan and Tunisian territory (producing bloody strife at Bizerte [Tunisia] in 1961) and over the rights of French nationals to retain possession of local agricultural estates. Tunisia's sequestration of European farm property in the spring of 1964 led to a virtual diplomatic rupture with the de Gaulle regime.

¹ Libya achieved independence under United Nations auspices in December, 1951; the Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates were terminated in March, 1956; Algeria freed itself from France in July, 1962.

North African relations with the Arab East have been similarly unsettled. Both Morocco and Tunisia waited more than one year after achieving independence before making formal application for admission to the Arab League. On the surface, Maghreb-ian-Arab world relations appeared harmonious; Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya condemned the British-French attack upon Suez in 1956, and expressed reservations concerning the American landings in Lebanon in 1958. Yet, considerable reserve was apparent in their daily dealings with Near Eastern states. All of them wished to avoid entanglement in the convoluted politics of the Near East, especially the intramural rivalries of local chieftains over prestige and doctrinal issues. Nevertheless, Tunisia has collided on several occasions with the United Arab Republic over the latter's leadership aspirations and, in mid-1965, it broke completely with the U.A.R. over such issues as the Palestine problem, diplomatic relations with West Germany, and the leadership role that President Nasser was seeking in the Middle East and North Africa.

By comparison, Morocco and Algeria have recently sought to adopt a neutral stance in a growing number of imbroglios among Near Eastern leaders. The first Arab League meeting to be held in North Africa was convened at Casablanca in 1959 and its host, Mohamed V, observed: "If the League has known an oriental period, it now has its Maghrebi period." A second conference was held in the same city in mid-1965, and Mohamed V's successor, his son, King Hassan II, strove earnestly and with brief success to bind the wounds that Arab world leaders had inflicted on one another over various issues. The subsequent emergence of new feuds has not dampened Hassan's enthusiasm for the role of patient mediator—within the past six months, he has developed more intimate associations with several Near Eastern leaders, particularly the monarchs of Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Morocco's efforts to safeguard and to maximize its freedom of action in the Arab world have been emulated by Libya in recent years.

The discovery of large quantities of commercially exploitable petroleum deposits in the late 1950's led Libya to concentrate on its own development. (One of the Middle East's best endowed oil-producing states—current output is in excess of one million barrels of crude oil daily—Libya may eventually rival Kuwait in income.) As a result, the government of King Idris I has striven to moderate regional disagreements and, where possible, to pursue a middle course between contending factions.

Algeria, on the other hand, sought to recapture its Homeric past by aligning itself with revolutionary forces in the immediate postwar period. Under the direction of President Ahmed Ben Bella, Algerian policies were placed in tandem with the U.A.R., and a mutuality of outlook rapidly crystallized. By mid-1964, several hundred Egyptians were serving in Algeria as teachers, technical advisers and military instructors; more than 50 Algerians reportedly enrolled in U.A.R. military training courses. For his part, President Ben Bella pledged unreserved support for Palestine Liberation Forces and announced Algeria's willingness to make its own forces available for the Arab struggle against Israel. However, the deposition of Ben Bella by his defense minister, Colonel Houari Boumediene, on June 19, 1965, produced a downturn in Algerian-U.A.R. relations. The U.A.R. reacted with consternation to Ben Bella's imprisonment. Its efforts, through various devices, to secure the former president's release irritated the new Algerian leadership. These differences have since been eliminated and Colonel Boumediene's official visit to Cairo in November, 1966, signaled the beginning of a new period of detente between the two leaders.

Intra-Maghreb-ian relations also have been somewhat unsettled in recent years, frustrating earlier efforts to establish a regional community of interest. While the three formerly French-dominated states of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have undergone somewhat similar experiences in efforts to sever France's colonial umbilical cord, each has followed a different path of political evolution since

successfully terminating French rule. Morocco has emerged as a constitutional monarchy under the firm direction of King Hassan; Habib Bourguiba brought the Tunisian ruling house down several years after independence was achieved and has since created a *parti unique* system, serving as president of his country and head of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party.

ALGERIA EMERGES

Algeria emerged from more than seven years of conflict as a nation in deep distress. More than 500,000 Algerians had been killed or wounded; 2 million had been uprooted and placed in "relocation" centers; in excess of 300,000 Muslims had fled the country to await the outcome of the conflict as refugees in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. Compounding the difficulties of the nationalist leadership, approximately 90 per cent of the European community (of one million) fled Algeria shortly after the signing of the Evian Accords which terminated the lengthy hostilities. Thus Algeria was deprived of trained personnel capable of maintaining the country's governmental institutions and modern economic sector—once the preserve of the European colony.

Because of these problems, the signing of the Evian Accords in March, 1962, spelled the successful conclusion of one revolution and the continuation of a second, more profound struggle. In addition to the myriad problems of postwar reconstruction, independence unleashed all the intrinsically fissiparous forces that had been accommodated within the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). Divisions rapidly emerged among various factions—within the military, and even among the founders of the F.L.N. At issue were wartime misdemeanors, ideology, ethnic ties, loyalties to various personalities and competing perspectives on the nature of Algerian society. At stake was the locus of power.

Out of the welter of conflicting interests and groups, Ben Bella emerged as Algeria's man of the hour, albeit supported by the armed forces at the disposal of Colonel

Boumediene. But Ben Bella's stewardship, lasting almost three years, failed to unify a war-torn nation. Surrounding himself with sycophants, Ben Bella engaged in a series of political maneuvers and improvisations calculated to strengthen his personal power. Political and economic reforms failed; the F.L.N. went into a slow decline as a result of uncertain leadership; one by one the president's erstwhile supporters defected. And, finally, his own military commanders rebelled in mid-1965, ending one-man rule, and returning to the principles of collegial leadership and decision by consensus that had well served the country's liberation movement during the conflict with France.

Unfortunately, Algeria's postwar political sorting-out process was attended by serious disagreements with Morocco and Tunisia, which dealt a severe blow to prospects for regional cooperation. Prior to 1962, Algeria's neighbors had lent material and political support to the F.L.N. by: (1) providing sanctuaries for F.L.N. military forces; (2) making their territory available for transshipments of arms; (3) extending vigorous diplomatic backing for Algerian nationalist objectives at the United Nations; and (4) offering safe-haven for several hundred thousand refugees. In addition, the dominant political parties from the three countries—the Istiqlal (Morocco), Destour (Tunisia), and F.L.N. (Algeria)—met at Tangier, Morocco, in April, 1958, to pledge support for a postwar program that would insure "a tight solidarity" of North African interests. A permanent secretariat was subsequently formed and met on several occasions.

But hopes for solidarity, if not union, foundered on Moroccan and Tunisian requests for boundary rectifications in the Sahara, as well as a host of other, unrelated issues. Morocco's claims to the Tindouf region in southwestern Algeria ultimately resulted in a brief, punishing border war between the two states that was brought to an end by the intercession of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) in November, 1963. While relations have since been restored, the

boundary issue continues to vex the two nations. Moroccan and Tunisian anxieties have been further heightened by the substantial increase in arms supplied to Algeria by the Soviet Union over the past two years.

Nevertheless, serious efforts have been made to tamp down differences: (1) Algeria, under Colonel Boumediene, has sought to quiet the agitation of anti-Bourguiba exiles; (2) a far-reaching economic agreement was concluded between Algeria and Tunisia on November 28, 1963, covering the use of energy resources; (3) Moroccan and Algerian military delegations exchanged visits in 1966 as an earnest of local intentions to harmonize relations. In addition, all four Maghrebian states have agreed to establish a series of advisory bodies to study means for facilitating regional economic cooperation. A nine-member consultative committee has been formed with headquarters in Tangier, and an Industrial Studies Center has Tripoli, Libya, as its venue. However, these are only the initial steps in a slow process of regional accommodation, and most observers have concluded that several major political hurdles remain before effective regional integration is likely to become a reality.

WITHIN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

A number of factors have contributed to the development of a broad community of interests between the Arab North and sub-Saharan Africa. Negatively, the rude turmoil of politics in the Near East, together with the failure to fashion a lasting regional consensus in the Maghreb, forced the leaders of North Africa to search elsewhere for allies. The processes of decolonization militated against untroubled relations with the former metropole (France) and a recent history of policy collisions with the United Kingdom over Middle East questions ruled out a special relationship with the British.²

² Libya proved the exception. A special defense treaty was concluded in August, 1954, permitting the U.K. to station military forces in Libya for a period of 20 years. The U.K. has since reduced its garrisons.

³ Editor's note: Algeria later attended the meetings of the Casablanca group.

In a harsh and demanding world, the Maghreb looked southward for nations sharing similar interests and aspirations. Clearly, a number of advantages obtained in seeking African "allies." The old world order was crumbling; the states of the less developed world, because of their inherent weakness, could hope to influence efforts to reshape the newly unfolding international community only if mutual interest alliance systems could be fashioned. North Africa, moreover, benefitted from its geographic position and could hope to serve as a hyphen between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world and Asia. In addition, virtually all African states had a shared experience of European tutelage—at least 15 had felt the profound impact of French rule, including Gallic culture. The many-sided problems of nation-building confronted all their leaders, many of whom were disposed to view setbacks in neighboring states with as much alarm as if they had occurred in their own. Finally, the history of relations among sub-Saharan leaders had not been so antagonistic and abrasive as in the Arab world.

Initially, pioneering efforts at definition of mutual interest tended to emphasize ideological questions. Thus, the breakdown of authority in the Congo in July-August, 1960, led to a Casablanca grouping of African nations that included Morocco, the U.A.R., Ghana, Guinea and Mali.³ Essentially revisionist, the so-called Casablanca bloc sought a greater African role in the Congo, called for the adoption of foreign policies predicated upon the principle of nonalignment, and called for the elimination of European neo-colonial influence in Africa. A subsidiary effort was made by the Casablanca "powers" in the trade union field. In May, 1961, an All-African Trade Union Federation (A.A.-T.U.F.) was founded at Casablanca—with the *Union Marocaine du Travail* (U.M.T.) serving as principal sponsoring organization. The U.M.T., with its more than 600,000 members, provided a formidable apparatus for an attempt to purge the African labor movement of Western influence.

However, the rise of the revisionist bloc

merely served as a catalyst for Africa's moderate leaders, who coalesced in a counteralignment, the Monrovia bloc.⁴ The "Monrovia states" emphasized regional accommodation and "good-neighborliness," and declared themselves opposed to the revisionist and "expansionist" activities of the Casablanca grouping. To counter the influence of A.A.-T.U.F. a rival trade union was formed and secured the endorsement of the majority of African labor organizations.

A period of rivalry and travail ensued, hallmarked by occasional acts of violence. Africa appeared threatened by fragmentation. However, under the prodding of Emperor Haile Selassie, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May, 1963, the divergent groups reconciled their basic differences, dissolved their competing blocs and formed a continental amalgam, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.).

CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

The years following the inception of the O.A.U. have witnessed growing cooperation between the North African states and those below the Sahara. Economic agreements have been concluded between Morocco and Senegal, as well as between Algeria and Mali (and Mauritania), and Tunisia has shored up its relations with a number of francophonic states. In addition, the three Maghrebian nations mentioned above have lent support to a host of liberation movements, particularly those from Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. Algeria and the U.A.R. were in the forefront of African nations seeking to aid eastern Congolese rebels during the brief rule of Congo Prime Minister Moise Tshombe. Finally, under O.A.U. auspices, the U.A.R. and Algeria were the principal intermediaries in the 1966 Ghana-Guinea dispute, involving the forced removal of the Guinean foreign minister from an airplane at Accra.

Nevertheless, Arab relations with African communities have occasionally been less than harmonious. Certainly, the bloody in-

tercommunal strife that erupted on the East African islands of Zanzibar and Pemba during January, 1964, is testimony to the continuing problem of racial accommodation. The several days of violence topped the dominant Arab oligarchy, stripped the Arab commercial class of its holdings, and produced a social revolution that is yet to be acted out. The massacre of Arabs by Africans shocked North Africans, but the passage of time has healed some of the wounds.

That such a healing process has not developed in the Sudan is evidenced by reports of continuing conflict between the Arab rulers at Khartoum and the Nilo-Hamitic peoples in the country's three southern provinces. The refractoriness of the southern secessionist movement, the ANYANYA, which apparently has support among the Sudan's 3 million Nilo-Hamites, has taxed the resources of the current Sudanese government. Its military predecessor, headed by General Ibrahim Abboud, had tried to enforce Arabization on the Christian-animist south, a program that ultimately provoked stiff resistance. The existing regime, headed by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, is seeking to mollify southern sentiment and to formulate a compromise, possibly one that will accord an increased measure of autonomy for the southern provinces.

To date, the Sudan's difficulties have not aroused anti-Arab sentiment in neighboring states. The reason for African moderation is not difficult to perceive. A successful secession effort on the part of the southerners

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William H. Lewis served as a visiting professor in Middle Eastern and African studies at the University of Michigan during the 1965-1966 academic year, and is the editor and coauthor of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), *Emerging Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964) and *French-speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965). He is a frequent contributor of review articles to professional journals.

⁴ The Monrovia group included the Brazzaville group of 12 formerly French states south of the Sahara plus, among others, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Congo (Leopoldville).

In this author's view, "As 1966 was nearing its end, a description of Nigeria as a nation was an exaggeration," although "the interrupted constitutional talks had indicated at least a consensus to keep Nigeria together."

Nigeria in Crisis

By W. A. E. SKURNIK

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

THREE MILITARY COUPS, only two of them successful, rocked Nigeria during the first half of 1966. In their wake, unrest previously confined to the Western Region spread to the rest of the country. By the year's end, traditional, modern and military leaders concentrated their energies on finding a way to keep the federation together. No other country in Africa achieved its independence under more favorable circumstances than did Nigeria six years ago. Yet no other country was so shaken in 1966 that its continued existence as a political entity was openly called into question. A world seemed to separate the early bright prospects of the "giant of Africa" from the recent tragedy of somber violence which set Nigerian against Nigerian.

Mistrust and frustrations had been building up since the 1962 crisis in the Western Region, which split the Action Group (A.G.) into two hostile factions and led to a state of emergency, to the treason trials and conviction of A.G. leaders, and to the overriding strength of

dissident Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola in cooperation with Northern forces. Following the second national census in 1964, A.G. supporters became convinced that free elections in the West were impossible; the October, 1965, election was in fact boycotted and its results were rejected. The election was followed by major disorders, lawlessness and brigandage. Unrest reached such proportions that the federal authorities advised legislators not to use road transportation on their way to the federal territory of Lagos. Repeated demands that something be done to end the Western Region's crisis fell on deaf ears, and the federal prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, refused to intervene to restore order, on the grounds that "force can't bring peace to peoples' hearts."¹

In this atmosphere, the structural imbalance at the federal level aggravated tensions: the North had an absolute majority of seats in the federal legislature, so that the federation was controlled by one of its components. Other regions thus had the choice of either joining an already preponderant partner in a coalition government or remaining in opposition and losing their voice in making common decisions. Moreover, political parties based on majority support in one region sought allies in others, thus adding another threat to the existing imbalance, because these parties were based primarily on regional rather than national support.

In the light of the unwillingness and/or

¹Quotations are from the 1966 issues of *Le Monde*, *Afrique Nouvelle*, *West Africa*, and *The New York Times*. For an excellent discussion of the background, consult Richard L. Sklar, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966); and "Contradiction in the Nigerian Political System," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (August, 1965). The writer is grateful to Dennis Storer, a doctoral candidate, for allowing him to consult his private collection of miscellanea on Nigeria.

the inability of the Western and federal governments to restore order in the West, and as a result of rumors to the effect that some junior and middle grade army officers planned a military coup, Western Premier Akintola flew to Kaduna to meet with Northern Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello (the chief architect of the Northern People's Congress which controlled the federal coalition) on January 14, 1966. There they agreed, in the presence of Brigadier General Sam Ademulegum, a Westerner, to use the armed forces in a surprise "ruthless blitz" which would entrench Akintola as Western premier by the force of arms. Bello and Akintola dispatched a Northern colonel to Lagos to convey the message to the head of the Nigerian armed forces, Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

But somehow the young rebels, who had apparently secured the cooperation of some civilian politicians, learned of the planned "blitz" and decided to act forthwith. Early in the morning of January 15, they took over certain strategic points and arrested major political leaders in all regions and in the federal territory. Many of the politicians arrested, including federal Prime Minister Balewa, the federal finance minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh, Western Premier Akintola, and Northern Premier Bello, were subsequently assassinated.

The attempted military takeover failed, however, apparently because the bulk of the armed forces remained loyal to federal authorities. Ironically, it led to a federal military government headed by General Ironsi. The original military coup appeared to be most successful in the North, where Major Chukwuma Nzegwu, a Westerner who grew up in the North, announced over Radio Kaduna that he had formed a new government of civil servants (including some expatriates) in the name of a Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, and that several Northern ministers had been tried and shot, and martial law declared.

What happened at the federal center is much more confused. There were reports that General Ironsi was at first arrested by

the rebels, then that he had either escaped or had been released. A cabinet meeting under the acting federal president, Nwafor Orizu, refused to appoint an acting federal premier and instead sought the advice of the federal president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was in London at the time. Two days of frantic negotiations led a rump cabinet to turn over the federal government officially, but "temporarily," to General Ironsi. This decision was made at the Lagos headquarters of the federal police in a meeting attended by, among others, senior cabinet members such as Alhaji Z. B. Dipcharima, Foreign Minister Alhaji N. Bamali, Attorney General T. O. Elias, senior police officials, General Ironsi, and the British high commissioner, Sir Francis Cummings-Bruce.

General Ironsi subsequently confirmed that he was the supreme commander of a new federal military government, and that the regions were headed by military governors responsible to him. Executive and legislative organs were abolished at both federal and regional levels, and the regional and federal courts and civil service continued to function under military rule.

THE IRONSI REGIME

The new military government consisted of two bodies; first, the supreme military council which included Ironsi as president, the supreme commander of the armed forces, the heads of the three branches of the armed forces and the military governors of the four regions; and, second, the federal executive council also headed by Ironsi, which included the above, less the regional governors but plus the police inspector-general and his deputy. The regional military governors were all officers from colonial times: Lieutenant Colonel Francis Adekunle Fajuyi in the West, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Ejoor in the Mid-West, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Hassan Usman Katsina in the North, and Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu in the East. All, out of caution or loyalty, had backed the federal authorities during the first coup, and hence could be expected not to have excessive sympathies for the rebel leaders.

The Northern rebellion was ended through negotiations between Major Nzegwu and General Ironsi. Nzegwu announced in Kaduna that his agreement with Ironsi provided for the safety of himself and his followers, compensation for the families of those who lost their lives, release of those arrested in the West and, significantly, that the old civilian regime would remain deposed. Ironsi subsequently sent a friend of Major Nzegwu, to Kaduna to escort the Northern rebel leader safely to Lagos, the national capital.

In view of the ethnic overtones of subsequent events, it is useful to try to understand the rebels' motivations. Although the majority of the rebel leaders were Ibo, it seems that their chief motives were the removal of civilian political leaders whom they considered to be corrupt beyond redemption, the institution of a unitary state, and the speeding up of progress toward modernization. Shortly after his takeover in the North, Major Nzegwu announced that he wanted to end corruption and disorder, and referred to the Northern Region as a "province" as he declared martial law. The emphasis on corruption as a major motive was confirmed later in interviews with the rebel leaders. That so many prominent Northern politicians met their death may have been due chiefly to their prominence in the national government. The rebel leaders have also declared that Chief Obafemi Oyeniyi Jeremiah Awolowo, the Western Action Group leader confined in the Calabar federal prison, was their choice as head of the new government, and that half of the new national leadership was to be made up of Northerners. Nonetheless, it remains true that Michael Okpara, Eastern premier, was not killed; ethnic solidarity may have played a role in this.²

The behavior of the new military government suggested that its goals were similar to those of the rebels. (The national economy was progressing relatively satisfactorily and

thus needed no major changes.) The issues singled out by the Ironsi government as most important, i.e., corruption, centralization of the national administration, and the replacement of federal by unitary ties, indicated also that the Ironsi government behaved in the classic manner of the military: it regarded problems as chiefly technical in nature and hence amenable to rational solutions.

First, Ironsi and his colleagues vigorously attempted to erase all traces of corruption with which the previous leaders had become tainted. Each region had its own public corporations for development, finance, agricultural credit and housing, as well as its marketing boards. Their purpose had been to harness economic forces and use them for overall economic development. These corporations and boards, however, had become enmeshed in political partisan considerations to such an extent that their *raison d'être* came to be widely questioned. Many qualified Nigerians refused to serve with these organizations lest their personal reputation be tarnished. Recruitment and promotion had come to depend more on political connections than on merit, and large numbers of unemployed, unsuccessful politicians had been rewarded with sinecures for past political service.

The Ironsi government therefore proceeded to dismiss scores of political appointees and to replace them with civil servants chosen for their competence. Moreover, numerous inquiries were launched into the past activities of dismissed officials. In the West, for example, 12 former ministers and 5 others were charged with conspiracy to defraud the Western marketing board of approximately \$175 thousand. Also in the West, it was estimated that the government corporations had lent some \$2.24 million to select individuals; the military governor called upon them to repay their debts within one month or face prosecution.

Second, the military leaders set out to centralize the country's administrative machinery in order to increase its efficiency through coordination and decision at the national level. Ironsi accordingly created a

² Okpara was acting as official host to Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus at the time of the rebellion, and the rebels' fear of creating an international incident probably accounts for the Eastern premier's safety at that time. Okpara was subsequently arrested on corruption charges.

special commission to study the unification of the administration, the public services and the courts on a national basis. The new policy was implemented by transferring authority from the regions to Lagos, slowly, but increasingly. Thus, a number of ministries were centralized, regional public service commissions were stripped of their authority to appoint and promote most civil servants and transformed into mere advisory bodies; the general announced that recruitment and promotions would henceforth be based solely upon merit and efficiency.

In view of the social system prevailing in the Northern Region, the most drastic changes occurred there. Lieutenant Colonel Katsina dissolved the Northern council of chiefs and replaced it with another council with himself as head, whose members he appointed, and whose advice was no longer binding on the government. Units of the Northern Native Administration, which for all practical purposes was the government, were stripped of most of their functions. The 750 Native Courts which in this vast and sparsely populated area handled nearly all criminal cases, as well as the Native Authority police, came under national operational control prior to their full integration. Perhaps most important, Katsina repudiated the previous policy of "northernization" of the regional civil service, which had been designed to prevent the influx into the North of large numbers of southerners, committed himself instead to an open-door policy, and abolished the Hausa language requirement for Northern civil servants.

Third, General Ironsi altered the constitutional basis of Nigeria from a federation to a unitary state. This change was announced shortly after he took over the national government and, in late March, he appointed a constitutional review study group to

identify those faults of the former constitution of Nigeria which militated against national unity and against the emergence of a strong central government. . . .

In addition to the administrative centralization measures mentioned above, Ironsi en-

larged the federal executive committee through the addition of the military governors to underscore the theme of national unity, and renamed the regions "provinces" in anticipation of formal constitutional change.

The final decision to go through with the creation of a unitary Nigeria was announced officially on May 24, 1966. In a speech to the nation, Ironsi declared that the regions were formally abolished, that the public services would be unified, that all political parties were dissolved, and that military rule would continue until 1969. This decision in effect abolished the federation by military decree and notified the country that the "temporary" military government had decided that it would continue in office for another three years.

PRELUDE TO UNREST

It seems clear that General Ironsi had not mastered the fine art of government and was not attuned sufficiently to the political realities in his country to be able to implement his decisions. Perhaps because of his professional bias concerning chains of command, he neglected to consult traditional and modern political leaders before making the momentous decisions referred to above. His method had been first to unify the administrative apparatus, then to call together a constitutional study group, and only then to announce his decision—before that group or any regional group was consulted or could submit recommendations.

Moreover, Ironsi had ignored unmistakable warning signs, perhaps secure in his confidence that the armed forces were capable of enforcing decisions regardless of the populations affected. In the North, where the power basis of religious leaders was brutally called into question by the military reforms, there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction. Newspapers had begun to suggest that Ironsi, an Ibo, was the symbol of a drive for Ibo domination of Nigeria, and questions were raised about the motivations of the general as he refused to prosecute the young Ibo rebels, most of whom remained safe in protective custody in the Eastern Region. A

delegation of Northern emirs, sometime in February according to the Sultan of Sokoto, had told Ironsi

in clear and no uncertain terms that to abolish the regions arbitrarily without the consent of the people would bring about chaos and confusion.

Whether or not these words were meant as a prophecy, soon after the general's May 24 policy speech the North became the scene of large-scale riots, demonstrations and killings directed against Ironsi specifically and the Ibo generally. Nearly two million Ibo had migrated North, taking with them a tradition of private entrepreneurial skills, and had become relatively well-to-do shopkeepers and skilled employees of private and public services. Most remained socially unintegrated, frequently demonstrated a haughty contempt for the "backward" Northerners, and favored aggressive changes toward modernization. Hence they incurred deep-seated hostility, especially on the part of conservative religious leaders. When it appeared to the Northerners that the Ironsi regime was an Ibo conspiracy to take over Nigeria, their reaction was to release accumulated frustrations, probably with the approving nod and at the behest of at least some of their traditional leaders.

After calm was restored, Ironsi and Katsina hastily retracted their previous stand: they explained that their decisions had been mere suggestions and assured the North that nothing would be done without the people's consent. Responding to further pressures by emirs, Ironsi assured them that any decision would be by referendum, and Colonel Katsina told a group of emirs that they remained, in effect, part of the government machinery.

THE NORTHERN REBELLION

In a belated attempt to end the unrest and gather support for his policies, Ironsi called a meeting of Nigerian "leaders of thought" in Ibadan. It appears, however, that this was too late because a group of Northern officers had already decided to overthrow Ironsi. Nothing conclusive is known about the identity or alignment of the new "rebels," except that they included Northern military

leaders, some officials of the Supreme Military Council, and possibly some civilians. The rebels decided to take advantage of Ironsi's exposed position away from Lagos and hence struck in Ibadan. Ironsi was arrested together with his official host, Western Military Governor Fajuyi, and assassinated along with several other Ibo officers.

Press reports indicate that there followed a three-day period of confusion during which Nigeria was without a central government and which was ended by negotiations between rebels and various members of the "national" leadership. The rebels apparently at first asked for a return to the status quo before January 15, with a civilian federal government; then demanded that Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, chief-of-staff of the armed forces, assume control; and, finally, declared their intention to let the North secede from Nigeria. It was reported that Ogundipe was attempting to crush the rebellion, first by sending troops to a rebel stronghold, then by dispatching Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon as his personal emissary to the rebels. By July 29, the rebels controlled three Western cities and the Lagos airport, had eliminated Ironsi and Fajuyi, and taken Gowon prisoner. Nonetheless, Gowon, apparently negotiating on behalf of the rebels, was persuaded to take command of a new national military government.

In a sense, prospects looked promising shortly after Gowon took over in July, 1966. First, minority representatives were given prominence in order to avoid the antagonisms between the major ethnic groups. Gowon himself is a Christian from a small Northern tribe in the Middle Belt area; the secretary of the new federal military government is a minority member from the Mid-West; and the same features appeared in most regional delegations to the subsequent national constitutional conference.

Second, the Gowon regime was quick to release from prison many important Nigerian leaders in an attempt to assuage tensions. Among those freed were Chief Awolowo and his deputy, as well as Okpara, the former Eastern premier.

Third, Gowon immediately revoked the Ironsi unification decrees and announced his opposition to either extreme of unitary structure or secession. Instead he suggested four alternative arrangements, including an either weak or strong federation, a confederation, or a new arrangement unique to Nigeria.

Finally, Gowon was sensitive to the need for widespread consultation to arrive at a viable consensus regarding the country's structure. A preliminary steering committee worked out some guidelines; then conferences in the regions among "leaders of thought" crystallized the regional positions and chose delegates for a constitutional conference whose proposals were to be approved in a nationwide referendum.

Regrettably, the vicious spiral of violence which followed the July coup destroyed lives and property, and also reaped a harvest of hatred and suspicion, a complete breakdown of confidence, and destroyed the Nigerian army as an effective force for the maintenance of law and order. The killings, lootings and burnings continued in the North and spread to other regions as well.

The situation worsened during September and October, when for the first time soldiers took part in violence against Easterners; according to the Northern military government, over 7,000 people were killed. In one case, soldiers mutinied and joined civilians in killing Easterners; the mutiny had to be put down by troops assisted by police units. The federal police, in fact, remained the only organization which could operate as an all-Nigerian law enforcement agent and the military leaders appealed to the police to retain discipline lest Nigeria be plunged into an uncontrollable civil war. By the end of October, 1966, the half million Eastern refugees who had fled the North between May and July increased to one million.

The Eastern region was near the brink of secession. The July rebellion was, to a large extent, motivated by a fear of Ibo domination and executed by Northerners. The East thus had not been a party to it and Ojukwu declared that his region had not been consulted when the final compromise led to

Gowon's takeover; he said that Brigadier Ogundipe, if anybody, should have taken command. Since Ibo and Northern soliders could no longer share the same barracks in peace, Ojukwu demanded that the army be regionalized; shortly afterward, most Nigerian troops were transferred to the region in which they were indigenous. (However, since there are few Western and Lagosian troops, Northern soldiers had to remain in the West and in the federal territory.)

As a result of the distintegration of the Nigerian armed forces, Gowon could not maintain his authority over the regional commanders or, indirectly, over the nation. His role was at times reduced to that of a man facing an intemperate crowd and pleading for order. The Eastern military governor, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, said publicly that he still considered Ironsi, not Gowon, as his superior, and later refused to come to Lagos for a meeting of the Supreme Command (the first to be held under Gowon), unless Northern troops in the West and Lagos be returned home and confined to their barracks. Ojukwu suggested instead that security in Lagos during common talks be provided by a neutral, Commonwealth force. Moreover Gowon, although himself a Northerner, had to leave the problem of law and order in that region to Katsina; his impotence was illustrated by the tenor of an appeal which he directed at the North:

I am very unhappy. . . . We should put a stop to this. It appears that this is going beyond reason. . . . We must remember that we shall be answerable to God.

Tensions and distrust also affected the constitutional conference. The conference met initially on September 13, 1966, with all regions represented. The original regional positions concerning the desirable number of states and the nature of future common ties changed several times and, by the end of 1966, no agreement had been reached. Following the October events, however, the Eastern representatives refused to attend and the meeting had to be postponed indefinitely. Eastern leaders were concerned about their safety in Lagos and suggested that the con-

ference adjourn to a foreign country, such as Liberia, Ethiopia or Switzerland.

CONCLUSIONS

As 1966 was nearing its end, a description of Nigeria as a nation was an exaggeration. Neither military nor civilian leaders appeared to enjoy legitimacy as symbols of Nigeria, mutual distrust and hatred among major ethnic groups had risen to new heights and caused a breakdown in communication, the country's economy was being jeopardized through prolonged unrest and disruption of public and private services, and continued rule by the army was confined to the regions.

Nonetheless, and in spite of noises about secession, it is remarkable that the interrupted constitutional talks had indicated at least a consensus to keep Nigeria together. On the basis of the available evidence, two major problems remained to be solved by such talks: the size and composition of the regions, and the nature of common relations. A cooling-off period with numerous informal contacts between leaders of majority and minority ethnic groups may lead to their eventual satisfactory solution.

Altering regional boundaries is a delicate task because of the possible centrifugal effects of "self-determination" and past inter-regional rivalries. The January, 1966, events encouraged movements toward autonomy, and a campaign for autonomy was waged by minority groups in September outside the very building in which the constitutional conference was in session. Yet this remains an ideal, and possibly necessary, step in order to provide for relatively equal regions and to minimize the fear of domination. Relatively equal federal partners could resolve disputes by either a series of shifting coalitions with working majorities clustering around important issues, or by replacing majority government with government by consensus.

Under the circumstances, the continued existence of Nigeria as a political unit seems to depend, in the short run, upon acceptance of the lowest common denominator as a common tie, and on extraordinary efforts to convince others of mutual respect and sincerity.

Whether the new Nigerian constitution be called unitary or federal matters little: what is crucial is that it make possible the peaceful coexistence of its components by avoiding points of friction and thus maintaining a kind of status quo.

Rule by the armed forces appears to be transitional. The army in Nigeria tried to tackle the job of a Gulliver with lilliputian arrows. To have remained on the surface and operated only in the modern sector of the polity, seeking to end institutionalized corruption and to change the structure of the country, would have been difficult enough. But by attempting to reform the entire administration and civil service, especially in the North, the army activated a series of defensive thrusts from a basic segment of the traditional culture over which even African governments with a tightly structured single party have much less control than they would like to believe. Once that segment awoke from semi-dormancy, the waves it created shook the surface into such confusion that even communication became impossible.

It may well be that the tragedy of the Nigerian army, conjured up by Ironsi and suffered by Gowon, was less its inability to lay the groundwork for fundamental change than the military style it employed: the false expectation that social systems will stand at attention and obey orders from above with alacrity. It is possible that strong national leadership could have paved the way for future basic change with tact and understanding. But that was not to be.

The January, 1966, events showed the existence of a serious intergenerational conflict within the army's officer corps. The policy of the military governors suggests that they are impregnated with residual British values

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Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, **Walter Skurnik** was an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania Military College from 1963 to 1965. He is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs.

Writing of the new administration in Ghana and the reasons for Nkrumah's downfall, this observer of African affairs notes that "Empiricism is . . . the hallmark of the new chapter of its history upon which Ghana has now embarked."

Ghana after Nkrumah

By KEITH IRVINE
Specialist in African Affairs

THE NAMES OF Kwame Nkrumah and of Ghana have been closely associated for many years. The announcement made, after a coup d'état in Accra on February 24, 1966, that each was henceforth to follow a separate destiny, thus clearly signaled the ending of an epoch.

It is still too early to draw final conclusions about former President Kwame Nkrumah's political career, marked as it has been by triumph and error. Many forces influenced the decisions he took. Yet one fact—and it is sometimes a key to understanding him—is often overlooked. He underwent his political education in Franklin D. Roosevelt's America. From 1935 to 1945, he was absorbing at first hand the political messages of an America passing successively from depression to war to victory.

When, upon his return to England in 1945, he was met on the station platform by the late George Padmore,¹ his formative years ended and his political career began. There was no more time for learning—only for action and for Africa. Thus when NATO was being formed, Nkrumah was working as a political organizer in the Gold Coast. When the Korean war began in 1950, he was in James Fort Prison in Accra. The psychology of Dwight D. Eisenhower's affluent America was alien to him, presenting as it did a land-

scape different from that of the America he had known. When he drew on his own experience in making decisions, he drew on the experience of that earlier and different day. With other facts, this is worth remembering.

The coup d'état of February 24, 1966, occurred while Nkrumah and his entourage were visiting the People's Republic of China, en route to Hanoi. The Ghana army and police forces, having taken control, announced the formation of the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) to govern the country. The constitution was suspended, and parliament was dissolved. On February 28, the chairman of the N.L.C., Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah, broadcast a speech in which he said that the council had assumed control to end Nkrumah's one-man rule; to restore the independence of the judiciary, academic freedom, and the rights of the individual; and to end growing economic chaos, in order to guide the country back towards prosperity. In foreign policy, Ghana would continue to support the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). Ghana's policy of nonalignment was reaffirmed. It was also announced that attempts to subvert other African governments would cease. To symbolize the change, Ghana's original 1957 national flag—a red, yellow and green tri-color with horizontal stripes and a black star in the center—was restored, replacing the 1964 variant that had carried a white stripe in place of the yellow to match the colors of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party.

¹ Padmore, a West Indian, was a close friend of Nkrumah, acting as his advisor on Pan-African affairs. A former communist organizer, Padmore broke with Moscow before World War II.

The new period in Ghana's history that opened on February 24, 1966, is continuing. Considerable time has been spent by various committees probing the financial operations of the Nkrumah regime. A number of political personalities have been imprisoned, most of them for a comparatively short time. Fortunately, these steps could be taken without serious repercussions in the nation, thanks to the fact that tribalism, while it indubitably exists in Ghana, does not run so deep there as it does in many other African countries. To begin with, tribalism in Ghana is primarily linguistic rather than ethnic in character. More than half the Ghanaian population (numbering 7,945,000 in 1966, according to the Ghana Bureau of Statistics—including the Ashantis, the Fantis, the Brongs, and others—belong to the Akan linguistic group. Although the remainder—such as the Ga-Adangbe (8 per cent of the population), the Ewe (13 per cent), the Mole-Dagboni group, including the Mamprusi and the Dagomba, (16 per cent), and others²—have different languages and distinctive traditions, the peoples of Ghana nevertheless remain homogeneous enough to give the nation a considerable degree of freedom from such tensions as have recently produced political and social

² For detailed statistical information, see B. Gil, A. F. Aryee and D. K. Ghansah, "Tribes of Ghana," (Accra, Ghana: Census Office)—a report based on the 1960 census.

³ Territorially the two are not identical. When the British Crown Colony of the Gold Coast achieved independence on March 6, 1957, it simultaneously (a) took the name of Ghana, and (b) incorporated what had previously been the British-administered U.S. Trust Territory of Togoland, formerly a League of Nations Mandate. "British" Togo, however, had been administered from Accra from 1919 to 1957.

⁴ For example, by July, 1966, Ghana had completed the decimalization of its currency—replacing pounds, shillings and pence by *cedi* and *pesewa*.

⁵ A.I.D. Statistics and Reports Division, February 18, 1966. According to A.I.D.'s 1966 estimate (based on 1964 figures), Ghana's annual per capita income exceeded that of most other independent African countries, such as Nigeria (\$102), Ivory Coast (\$215), and Guinea (\$70), not to speak of such territories as Rhodesia (\$224), and also various Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey and Syria, and some Latin American states, such as Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. U.S. annual per capita income at the same time was \$3,272. Per capita income figures, evidently, provide only the roughest basis for comparison.

catastrophes in both the Congo states, and in Nigeria. Indeed, intermarriage, especially among educated Ghanaians, has progressed to such an extent that the nation is clearly evolving into a social as well as a political entity—a process which the use of English as the governmental language has not discouraged.

Economics, more than politics per se, however, remains the country's primary concern. Whether known as Ghana or the Gold Coast,³ from about 1950 on the population had become pragmatic converts to the revolution of rising expectations. Excelling (as several close observers have noted) in the difficult art of maintaining a full sense of traditional identity while steadily incorporating demonstrably useful new customs and concepts into the body of tradition, the Ghanaian people have shown themselves highly adaptable to the exigencies of a technological culture.⁴ They have, however, become accustomed to living with certainties. Since the post World War II recession which helped to bring Nkrumah to power, life has, until comparatively recently, been improving at a recognizable pace. By 1966, for example, Ghana's annual per capita income, which in 1960 was estimated to be \$169, had risen to \$251.⁵ For this reason the increasing financial troubles that plagued the closing months of the Nkrumah regime were regarded by public opinion as "unnatural."

Cocoa, of course, has long been the mainstay of the national economy, producing most of the foreign exchange required. Since its creation in the 1940's, the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board had held reserves to cushion cocoa farmers from the effects of a bad year. By 1958, for example, such reserves totalled over \$148 million. But over a period of years, the reserves had been used for other purposes. Thus in July, 1965, when cocoa on the New York exchange dropped to 12¢ a pound or less, the economy was clearly in trouble. (In 1954, cocoa prices had reached a record average of 57¢ a pound and in 1957 had sold at 30¢.)

When the bad year came—whether or not the circumstances were politically contrived—

the cocoa farmers, and indeed the public at large, was called upon to absorb the economic shock without any protective cushioning. Stores were emptied of imported goods—even, sometimes, of such commodities as the tinned milk that Ghanaians had not lacked within living memory. Trucks—the famous “mammy wagons,” which are the mainstay of the country’s transport system—were often immobilized for lack of tires, while expensive cars, sometimes less than a year old, were seen abandoned by the roadside for lack of spare parts. Import licenses for any kind of goods became scarce, and often those lucky enough to secure them hoarded the goods in order to drive the prices up still further.

Defenders of Nkrumah’s economic policy have claimed that whereas the moneys constituting the reserves had indeed been spent, much of the total represented investment in the country’s development. During Nkrumah’s administration, miles of new roads were constructed, piped water was brought to many regions for the first time, and—symbol of Ghana’s entry into modern economic life—the Volta River hydroelectric project was completed. Nkrumah, his defenders aver, had invested all available national resources in development, knowing that the world was approaching the point at which a new “Bretton Woods” conference would have to be held—a conference at which a reevaluation of credit-issuing machinery would be based upon the degree of development achieved by various countries. This might have been so, supporters of the N.L.C. have responded, but at the same time the policy amounted to adventurism, since it constituted a form of gambling with the nation’s reserves. There was no justification possible, they claimed, for taking control of a country with \$560 million in reserve securities in 1957, and leaving it in 1966 with only \$112 million, almost all of which was pledged against funds borrowed—not to speak of debts estimated as amounting to \$860 million. In addition, some of the expenditure had not actually been spent

on useful development, but on prestige projects; and some had been squandered in corrupt practices.

Whatever the rights or wrongs of Nkrumah’s economic policies, the N.L.C. found itself obliged to meet the stern realities immediately. A program of stabilization was established. New projects were discountenanced, government expenditures were cut, and 20 embassies abroad were closed. In effect, the period of economic consolidation that the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) had unsuccessfully urged upon the Nkrumah government in 1965 was begun. Representatives of the new government also held meetings with creditors abroad. As a result, by the end of 1966, arrangements were concluded to refinance most of Ghana’s external debts. In this way, the financial future once more became relatively calculable, and with the restoration of confidence that resulted, both the I.M.F. and various governments extended credit—the I.M.F. to the extent of \$53.65 million in 1966.

Economically, therefore, the N.L.C. could claim considerable progress in its efforts to restore financial order. Only two concerns remained—the problem of unemployment resulting from financial retrenchment, and the failure of attempts to conclude an international cocoa agreement under United Nations auspices.

The unemployment problem has been particularly acute in the principal towns. As is the case elsewhere in Africa in recent years, towns have been growing at a rapid pace, as people leave the outlying rural areas to seek fresh job opportunities. The population of Ghana’s capital, Accra, for example, increased from 344,600 in 1960 to 532,600 in 1966, and, in the same period, the population of Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti region, increased from 182,500 to 251,900. The government is now encouraging people to return to farming, but not many have done so. Unemployment therefore constitutes what was recently described by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Accra as “both a political and social problem” that “should give the government some worry.”⁶ Government economists

⁶ See “Economic Survey 1965,” published by Authority of the National Liberation Council. Accra, August 1966, p. 106.

hope, however, that by 1968 the situation will have eased and that economic expansion will be resumed. By about that time, incidentally, Ghana should be well on the way back to civilian rule. A commission was recently set up to draft a new constitution that is to be presented to a constituent assembly, after which the approved constitution will be promulgated and elections held.

The first United Nations Cocoa Conference was held in 1963, but failed to reach agreement. Higher hopes were entertained for the success of a second conference, held in New York in May and June, 1966, and aimed, among other objectives, to ensure "remunerative, equitable, and stable" prices. However, although President Lyndon Johnson of the United States several times emphasized the necessity of concluding a cocoa agreement without delay, the conference adjourned without reaching agreement, and participants in informal talks held later in the year to see whether the situation had improved were unable to make any optimistic pronouncement. Apart from considering questions involving an export quota system, the workings and financing of buffer stocks, and measures for increasing world cocoa consumption, the conference had hoped to reach an agreement that would end violent fluctuations in the price of cocoa by establishing floor and ceiling prices, thus permitting Ghana and other cocoa-producing countries to plan their economies with more assurance. The United States National Confectioners Association, however, in the summer of 1966 reaffirmed its opposition to a cocoa agreement, and recommended instead a free market for cocoa. Commenting on this, Ghana's United States representative, Ambassador F. S. Arkhurst, stated:

It is not immediately clear why the cocoa industry is opposed to a Cocoa Agreement, but one could reasonably surmise that the opposition is motivated by the thought that since speculation yields some men the elements of life, the conclusion of a Cocoa Agreement regulating prices will deprive them of their means of livelihood. There is also the baseless fear that an assured remuneration would induce the producing countries to produce more than is warranted. Apart

from the fact that these motives are rather narrow and ignore the benefits that would accrue to all, there is in fact no economic justification for these motives. A Cocoa Agreement is not incompatible with speculation since speculators are free to speculate as much as they like within the agreed minimum and maximum price range. Moreover, the fear of over-production is groundless, since one of the essential elements of the agreement envisaged is to regulate production through the imposition of sales quotas and other measures.

The secretary-general of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Raul Prebisch, also said that he could not conceal his disappointment. Pointing out that the main obstacle remained the price level, he said that the difference between producers and consumers was small indeed—20 to 22 cents on the producers' side, and 19 to 21 cents on the consumers' side. "Large-scale consumers," Prebisch stated, "maintained that the floor price could not be higher than 19 cents," while adding that "in all good conscience" he could not recommend that the producers accept this, since only once in the past 20 years had prices fallen below 20 cents. His disappointment was without doubt all the keener because, of all commodities, cocoa was the one that had seemed to offer the best chance for price stabilization. If cocoa prices could not be stabilized, the outlook would be grim not only for Ghana, but for all developing countries producing primary commodities—or, to express it in more popular terms, for the Third World as a whole.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

One of the most striking differences between Nkrumah's policies and those of the N.L.C. is to be seen in Ghana's relations with other African countries. Nkrumah's policy was, in many respects, Jacobin in character. This led to strained relations with many, though not all, African governments, and at the same time to popularity among politically conscious groups throughout Africa. Nkrumah's overthrow has resulted in a reversal of this situation. Critics of the N.L.C. have risen in many African countries, but at the same time Ghana's relations with many African govern-

ments have improved dramatically. Of particular consequence, however, has been the improvement in relations with three countries bordering Ghana—the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and, above all, Togo—a country which, like Ghana, includes an Ewe population. The frontiers of all three countries, closed towards the end of the Nkrumah period, have now been reopened. Furthermore, with the completion of a new bridge across the Volta River, road traffic will flow freely between Accra and the Togolese capital of Lome, without delays at the ferry. One observer once commented that the main difference between Ghana and Togo is that in Togo a driver does not have to glance in his rear-view mirror when making a turn, since he may be certain that there will be no traffic behind him. As Ghana's commercial activity flows more freely across the frontier, this situation is likely to alter—even more so should the possibility of the sale of Volta River electricity for Togolese industry be realized.

Improved relations with various West African states have, however, not included Guinea, the country in which Ghana's former president, Kwame Nkrumah, now lives. After the coup, Ghana-Guinea relations reached their most acerbic point when, in the fall of 1966, Ghana arrested 19 Guineans in transit at the Accra airport, some of them diplomats en route to the Organization of African Unity conference in Addis Ababa. Although they were later released, the incident resulted in mutual recrimination. All these events, however, tend to confirm the view expressed some years ago by a thoughtful diplomat to the effect that future relations between West African states might be compared to those between participants in Ghana's most popular dance, the "high life." In this dance, he said, couples join together harmoniously for a while, and then break away to dance off, each enchanted with his or her own personality before regrouping once more in a constantly changing pattern of partnerships.

Such temporary regional differences as may

arise, however, are offset by long-range preoccupations which tend to unite all O.A.U. members. Like other African countries, Ghana, with or without Nkrumah, remains consistently concerned with the fate of the African majorities in Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, South West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa. It is, indeed, hard for Ghana to remain indifferent to the threat to peace and orderly development on the African continent posed by the growing strength and militancy of the openly racist white minority regimes which now control these territories. On such questions, therefore, the continuity of Ghana's national policy is evident—as, indeed, it has been over the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations, which Ghana continues to advocate, despite the sharp deterioration in relations between Accra and Peking. Relations with the Soviet Union, although not so close as in Nkrumah's day, remain largely unchanged. The Soviet Union has, in recent years, become a trading partner, so that a normal relationship, based upon economics rather than politics, would now appear to have been established.

Empiricism is, indeed, the hallmark of the new chapter of Ghana's history.

Writing in the Marxist *Monthly Review*, published in New York in the summer of 1966, the editors commented:

Like many others on the Left, both here and abroad, we were shocked by the February coup which overthrew the Nkrumah government in Ghana. . . . It seemed hard to believe that Nkrumah could have been overthrown in an almost bloodless coup which, according to all press reports, was greeted with popular approval rather than resistance. . . . Only one conclusion seemed possible: that the situation in Ghana was quite different from the appearance which we, along with many others, had all too uncritically accepted as the reality.⁷

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Keith Irvine, a specialist in African affairs, has over the past decade contributed articles to a wide variety of publications. He was formerly editor of *Africa Today* and *Africa Weekly*.

⁷ See Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer in a special issue of *Monthly Review*, "Ghana: End of an Illusion," New York, July-August, 1966.

Commenting on the failure of the International Court of Justice to rule on substantive issues in the South West Africa cases in 1966, this specialist comments that "the judgment and its implications will have a profound effect on the future of all southern Africa. . . ."

The South West Africa Cases

By KEITH HIGHET

*Counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia in the South West Africa cases
before the International Court of Justice*

IN THE SUMMER of 1966, the International Court of Justice delivered its final decision in the long-drawn-out proceedings known as the South West Africa cases.¹ It had been widely hoped that the court would rule on the principal questions of merits in the case: whether the mandate for the huge and arid Territory of South West Africa had survived the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946; whether South Africa as mandatory was required to submit to United Nations supervision of its administration of the territory in place of the previous supervision by the League; and whether the policy of *apartheid* applied to the territory by South Africa could be in conformity with its duty under the mandate to promote "the material and moral well-being and the social progress" of the inhabitants of the territory, the vast majority of whom are nonwhites.

The court's decision² shocked the world. On a narrow, technical ground, the court held that the mandates system had never contemplated a "legal rights or interest" in members

of the League to bring mandatory powers to court with regard to what the court described as the "conduct" of the mandates as opposed to "special interests"—rights specifically granted to League members or their nationals. The court held that the case related only to "conduct" provisions and that therefore the applicants had no standing to ask for a judgment. Thus the court even decided that applicants lacked standing with respect to the questions of survival of the mandate and United Nations supervision, on the ground that these matters were raised only "to provide the basis for their remaining submissions" (relating to the "conduct" provisions of the mandate) concerning which the court had already decided they had no legal right or interest. The outcome thus appeared to be that South Africa was exempt from any judicial sanction against the application of *apartheid* to its international trust, since no other state could possess any greater "legal right or interest" in the "conduct" of the mandate than the applicants.

In more than one way, the 1966 judgment recalled the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the tragic case of *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, decided in 1857.³ In both instances, judicial conservatism was stressed and narrow, inadequate and fragmentary historical analysis used to interpret a constitutional document. The *Dred Scott* case in essence held that a Negro could not be con-

¹ This was a contentious preceeding instituted by Ethiopia and Liberia as "applicants" (plaintiffs) in their capacities as past members of the League of Nations against South Africa as "respondent" (defendant) in its capacity as the "mandatory" (administrator) of the Territory of South West Africa under a mandate granted by the League of Nations in 1920. (The two cases were joined into one proceeding by order of the court on May 20, 1961.)

² *South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.

³ 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857).

sidered a "citizen," on the ground that Negroes were not so considered when the constitution was framed; the South West Africa cases in effect held that the practice of *apartheid* was not the type of matter for which it was considered that League members could have brought a mandatory to court when the mandates were framed.

The resemblance between these cases extends to the tone of the opinions as well as to the judicial attitude expressed; in *Dred Scott*, as in the South West Africa cases, a constitutional instrument was being interpreted. Yet was this not also true in *Brown v. Board of Education*,⁴ almost a century later than *Dred Scott*, in which the Supreme Court struck down separate educational facilities as being inherently violative of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the constitution? It is ironic to reflect that the applicants had in fact urged the *Brown* case upon the International Court as an example of sound constitutional interpretation and application.


The South West Africa cases were of unprecedented complexity, involving far-reaching questions of international law and issues of great contemporary significance, such as the nature of an international trust institution and its relationship to the United Nations, the legality under international standards of official policies of racial segregation, and the future of South West Africa. The fact that none of these issues were decided by the court was disappointing, but more important was that the judgment was a surprise.

Even the parties were astonished that the court could arrive at the conclusion it did, since the court had—in the judgment four years earlier⁵ on the questions of jurisdiction in the same case—ruled exactly the other way on the same point of law, and since the court had not only remained silent on this matter during oral proceedings (of historic length)

⁴ 347 U.S. 483, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 583 (1954).

⁵ *South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319.

* Editor's note: Since this map was drawn, Bechuanaland has become Botswana and Basutoland has become Lesotho, both now independent states.



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SOUTH WEST AFRICA*

in 1965, but had even participated vigorously in the development of questions of merits between the parties, such as the questioning of witnesses on *apartheid*.

The purpose of this article is not to examine the case itself in detail, but is rather to consider the history and background of the litigation and to discuss some issues of vital importance to world order and contemporary institutions presented by the 1966 judgment.

THE MANDATE: 1920–1960

The Allied Powers at the Versailles Peace Conference agreed that the Wilsonian principles of nonannexation, self-determination and international responsibility should govern the territories conquered during World War I, and the mandates system was born as the first great international institution embodying these concepts. The first paragraph of article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations sets forth the governing principle for this institution:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. . . .

The second paragraph of article 22 stated

that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations . . . who are willing to accept it, and . . . this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League."

The mandate for the former German colony of South West Africa was conferred on the Union of South Africa in 1920. The mandate instrument required the mandatory, generally, to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory" (article 2), specifically prohibited the slave trade, the sale of liquor and the militarization of the territory (articles 3 and 4), required free access by missionaries from other states members of the League (article 5), and required the mandatory to submit annual reports to the League Council (article 6). It also provided for the resolution by the Permanent Court of International Justice of disputes concerning the mandate (article 7).

From 1920 to 1939, South Africa duly submitted the administration of the territory to the supervision of the League Council and its permanent mandates commission.⁶ Following World War II, the trusteeship system was established under the United Nations, it being intended that those mandated territories which were not to become independent states would be entrusted to its protection.

The League did not formally dissolve, however, until 1946. At the closing sessions, the South African representative joined with other representatives of mandatory powers in assurances that the dissolution of the League would in no way diminish the mandatory's obligations under the mandate, which would

continue until other arrangements were agreed upon concerning the future status of the territory; and the League made no formal provision for transfer of responsibility over mandates to the United Nations.

South Africa then requested, but was refused, United Nations approval of a proposal to incorporate the territory. In 1948, the National Party came to power in South Africa for the first time, and the lines of its racial policy as well as of its confrontation with the international community began to harden. South Africa thereafter energetically contested United Nations efforts to supervise the administration of the territory, taking the position that the mandate had "expired" at the dissolution of the League; subsequently, the General Assembly turned to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the international status of the territory.

The opinion,⁷ delivered in 1950, ruled that the mandate was still in force, that South Africa must report and transmit petitions to the United Nations in place of the League and that the United Nations must consent to any modification of the status of the territory (although there was no "legal obligation" for South Africa to place it under the trusteeship system). The opinion was the authoritative pronouncement of the law of the mandate, which it characterized as having been "created, in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an international object—a sacred trust of civilization." The "conduct" obligations of the mandate, which were to be held unenforceable 16 years later, were said to "represent the very essence" of that sacred trust. With regard to the contention (made in court by South Africa) that the mandate had lapsed, the opinion said that to "retain the rights derived from the mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified."

In accordance with the advisory opinion,⁸ the General Assembly forthwith established the first of a long series of committees to supervise the performance of the mandate, which obtained information for their reports to the General Assembly from public sources

⁶ The commission (established pursuant to the provisions of article 22, paragraph 9, of the League covenant) was composed of experts in the administration of dependent territories. Written petitions from inhabitants of the territory were also transmitted to the commission (as required by a rule of the League Council of January 31, 1923).

⁷ *International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p. 128. (Advisory opinions are rendered pursuant to article 96 of the Charter.)

⁸ An advisory opinion is not a "judgment" of the court within the meaning of article 94 of the Charter (which provides for Security Council enforcement of judgments in contentious proceedings between states).

and from refugees and petitioners, since South Africa, relying on the technical unenforceability of the opinion, refused to cooperate.⁹ Year by year, the resolutions of the General Assembly were more strongly worded. By 1960, the United Nations had reached an impasse from which, it was thought, only a contentious proceeding could salvage the mandate.

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES: 1960-1966

The case brought in 1960 was founded on the "compromissory clause" of article 7 of the mandate, which states:

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. . . .¹⁰

The first two years of the litigation were consumed by consideration of South Africa's four "preliminary objections" to the jurisdiction of the court. These objections were to the following effect: (1) the mandate was no longer in force; (2) applicants could no longer be considered as "members" of a dissolved League of Nations; (3) there was no "dispute," inasmuch as no material legal rights or interests of applicants were involved; and (4) there had in any event been no "negotiations" between applicants and the

⁹ In 1955 and 1956, the court rendered two supplementary advisory opinions, ruling that procedures adopted by the United Nations for the exercise of supervision were in conformity with the 1950 Opinion; *South-West Africa—Voting Procedure, Advisory Opinion of June 7th, 1955*; *I.C.J. Reports 1955*, p. 67, and *Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of June 1st 1956*; *I.C.J. Reports 1956*, p. 23.

¹⁰ The substitution of the International Court of Justice (World Court) for the Permanent Court of the League was effected by article 37 of the statute of the Court (an integral part of the United Nations Charter accepted by South Africa).

¹¹ The first objection related to the requirement of article 37 of the statute (see preceding footnote) that treaties or conventions be "in force" to bring about the required substitution of forum; the remaining objections related to the terms of the compromissory clause itself.

¹² See footnote 5, *supra*.

¹³ *I.C.J. Reports 1962*, p. 343 (italics added).

mandatory.¹¹ In its binding judgment in 1962, the court dismissed each of these objections.¹²

In view of the court's ultimate disposition of the cases in 1966, the court's holding in 1962 with respect to the third objection is of particular significance. Lengthy written and oral arguments were then addressed to the point whether, on the basis of the history of the mandates system, members of the League were intended to have a legal right or interest sufficient to invoke the compromissory clause over general matters of the conduct of the mandate, rather than questions where specific material interests of members of the League and their nationals were involved. (Provisions of the mandates involving such material interests would have been, for example, the "missionary clause" in article 5 of the mandate for South West Africa, and the "missionary" and equal economic opportunity, or "open-door," clauses in the mandates for more developed territories.)

In dismissing the third objection, the 1962 judgment stated that the language used in the compromissory clause

. . . is broad, clear and precise: it gives rise to no ambiguity and it permits of no exception. . . . For the manifest scope and purpose of the provisions of this Article indicate that the Members of the League were understood to have a legal right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations both toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and its Members.¹³

Indeed, the court continued to state that

Protection of the material interests of the Members or their nationals is of course included within its compass, but the well-being and development of the inhabitants of the Mandated territory are not less important.

Consideration of the issues of merits in the case then resumed. Briefs of unusual length were filed, and the oral arguments consumed much of 1965. Hundreds of aspects of South African administration of the territory, of the policy of *apartheid*, and of the international law of human rights were canvassed in pleadings, argument and testimony, and although lengthy arguments were addressed to the survival of mandate obligations following

the dissolution of the League, there were no new arguments advanced concerning the right or interest of applicants in the proceedings.

The question of merits most energetically argued was, of course, *apartheid*. The applicants took the position that the undisputed facts of record—the existence of racially discriminatory laws in the territory—constituted the only facts required for the court to render a favorable opinion; they maintained that the court should interpret the words of article 2 of the mandate, “the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants,” by objective legal standards proscribing racial discrimination, expressed unequivocally in international agreements such as the Charter of the United Nations and the International Labor Organization constitution, and in regional conventions, multilateral declarations, and the practice of states and of United Nations organs.¹⁴ Their case was thus rested on the agreed facts of record and upon their arguments of law.

South Africa contended that it had unreviewable discretion, that its good faith or intentions should control, and that *apartheid* was necessary to prevent “bloodshed and chaos” in the territory. It brought 14 witnesses and experts to testify in its behalf, and their testimony and cross-examination consumed some 100 hours in open court.

At no stage in these lengthy and detailed proceedings did the court (or any individual judge) raise, directly or indirectly, the question of the applicants’ “legal right or interest” to bring the case. To the contrary, every implication was that the matter had been firmly settled by the 1962 judgment. Numerous judges assisted energetically in putting questions of merits to the parties and in de-

veloping and refining the issues of merits. Furthermore, they vigorously questioned witnesses and experts on points of merits. On June 22, 1965, the court itself even took the unusual step of putting formal questions to both sides, asking the views of the parties on the freedom of the court to select its own interpretation, not of the compromissory clause, *but of article 2 of the mandate*: the article against which *apartheid* was being measured.

It was thus with the greatest anticipation that the United Nations and its members, legal scholars, political analysts, and the world at large awaited the final judgment of the court on the merits, only to learn that although “applicants had *locus standi* to institute the actions in this case, this did not mean that they had the legal interest that would entitle them to a judgment on the merits,” in the words of the dissenting opinion of Judge Philip C. Jessup of the United States. Jessup then characterized this as “a procedure of utter futility” and proceeded to ask:

Why would the Court tolerate a situation in which the parties would be put to great trouble and expense to explore all the details of the merits, and only thereafter be told that the Court would pay no heed to all their arguments and evidence because the case was dismissed on a preliminary ground which precluded any investigation of the merits?¹⁵

This question applies to both sides in the case: how was it that South Africa could itself labor to adduce testimony of unprecedented length, without being at least advised that it might all be unnecessary?

One wishes that the answer were less difficult to reach. Fourteen judges voted in the judgment of 1966, and split seven to seven. The court reached its decision only by the double, or “casting,” vote of the president, Sir Percy Spender.¹⁶ The critical distinction drawn by the 1966 judgment, between “conduct” and “special interests” provisions of mandates, was explicitly drawn in 1962 by the joint dissenting opinion which was written by Judge Spender, and Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (voting with the dissenting minority on the question of jurisdiction).¹⁷

¹⁴ Applicants went further, advancing an alternative and cumulative argument that racial discrimination is so universally condemned that a compulsory rule (or “norm”) of international law has evolved outlawing racial discrimination and binding states without their consent.

¹⁵ *I.C.J. Reports 1966*, p. 382.

¹⁶ The statute of the Court (article 55, paragraph 2) gives the president the casting vote in case of a deadlock.

¹⁷ *I.C.J. Reports 1962*, pp. 549–50.

Moreover, there is no substantive reasoning in the 1966 judgment which was not in fact advanced in dissenting opinions in 1962. Of the seven judges voting in the 1966 majority, six had voted in the 1962 minority, and four had actually then relied on the reason (expressed in their dissents) that applicants had no legal right or interest in the dispute.¹⁸

How could this have happened? A *New York Times* editorial of July 20, 1966, suggested one reason: "Because the Court lineup had changed—due to death, illness and disqualification—between the acceptance of jurisdiction in 1962 and the verdict of 1966." Of the ten judges on the 1966 court who had participated in the 1962 judgment, six had been in the minority in 1962; only one vote was required¹⁹ (with the aid of the president's casting vote) to bring about the situation in 1966 where, in the words of Judge Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico in his dissenting opinion, "[t]he majority of the Court is reproducing on the present occasion the arguments adduced in dissenting opinions against the Judgment of 1962."²⁰ It could even be argued that the outcome of this historic case was a matter of tragic circumstance.²¹

SOME LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

Legal criticism of the judgment would have to consider in great detail the points which emerge from the argument and circumstances of the case. Certain observations may be made, however, on the basis of what has already been indicated.

The first and most obvious point is: how can a court overrule itself on questions of

law, when no new arguments are advanced? Although the 1966 judgment pretended to be passing on new matters which were not passed upon in 1962, in fact the reasons advanced by the majority in 1966 were merely those of the minority in 1962. Clearly, the difference between the judgments was occasioned neither by new legal arguments (which were not in any event made), nor by new reasoning by the court, but by a change in personnel. Is this not violently at odds with the basic purpose of the judicial function?

Second, the judgment of 1966 purported to adopt a praiseworthy attitude of judicial conservatism, hewing strictly to the intentions of the founders of the mandates system in 1920. Is there not an inconsistency, however, in that judicial exactitude and restraint are applied to the history of drafting of mandates so as to destroy any judicial protection of the "sacred trust of civilization," but are not applied with equal enthusiasm to the legal problem of the authority and scope of the 1962 judgment? The 1966 judgment did not, in fact, specifically reverse the 1962 decision.

The judgment was also inconsistent with the rules of the court itself, which provide that the court may delay consideration of jurisdictional questions by joining their decision to the merits of a case.²² Precisely because this power existed—and was not exercised—should the court then later be able to bring about this joinder retroactively by effectively reversing the jurisdictional decision already taken, without new or compelling reasons therefore and without in any event granting a hearing to the parties?

The judgment is internally contradictory inasmuch as it purports not to pass on the question of survival of the mandate. It is thus impossible to know whether the missionary clause—the only article of the mandate described by the court as containing a "special interests" provision—is still in existence.²³ Further, there emerges the logical problem of how, if the mandate were not in existence, would the court have jurisdiction (under its compromissory clause) to decide that appli-

¹⁸ Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice, *id.* at 549–60; Judge Bohdan Winiarski, *id.* at 449–58; Judge *ad hoc* Jacques Theodore van Wyk, *id.* at 658–62.

¹⁹ Provided by Judge André Gros of France, elected as from 1964.

²⁰ *I.C.J. Reports* 1966, p. 447.

²¹ Judge José Luis Bustamante y Rivero of Peru did not participate in the 1966 judgment because of ill health, and Judge Abdel Hamid Badawi of the U.A.R. died in August, 1965.

²² Rules of Court, article 62, paragraph 5.

²³ Judge Jessup wrote in his dissenting opinion: "Because Applicants did not specifically invoke . . . [the missionary clause], the Judgment denies them the right to obtain a finding whether the Mandate—on which any such right would rest—still subsists." *I.C.J. Reports* 1966, p. 424 (italics added).

cants have no legal right or interest under the mandate?

Finally, the judgment does not appear to be "just." This point does not relate to the destruction of 16 years of judicial precedent, or to the emasculation of an international institution of a humanitarian character: the point is purely procedural, and emerges from the lack of indication given by any judge or by the court that a jurisdictional issue was still capable of being considered as open. To the contrary, as has been pointed out, the undeniable implications conveyed by the conduct of judges and, in particular, by certain actions of the court itself, were that the attention of the court was firmly fixed on the merits. The maxim that not only must justice be done, but must appear to be done, should apply to international tribunals as well as to domestic courts.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS

The fact that the judgment appears only to have been made possible by changes in the personnel of the court is a particularly unfortunate development in the field of international adjudication, where the composition of tribunals has always attracted undue attention. An obvious decision of men, not of law, must inevitably weaken the already unstable currency of public international law. Particularly when such a decision effectively renders meaningless 16 years of judicial precedent relating to "an international institution with an international object,"²⁴ its natural consequence may unhappily be a loss of confidence in the court as an institution capable of orderly adjudication under reliable or predictable standards.

It has been suggested that the decision underscores the need for attention to the standards for selection of the judges of the court.²⁵ Indeed, the judicial elections of

November, 1966, saw the filling of a hitherto non-African seat by an African, resulting in two court seats being held by Africans for the first time.²⁶

AVOIDING "HOT" ISSUES

It may generally be observed that the court has, in the manner described, effectively avoided the adjudication of "hot" issues. Had the refusal of jurisdiction occurred in 1962, disappointment would surely have resulted. But the 1966 decision appears rather to have occasioned total dismay among the membership of the organization of which the court is, under article 92 of its charter, the principal judicial organ. The avoidance of a decision in the South West Africa cases has not only left unsolved an issue of vital concern to the United Nations, but has remitted it to political determination at a time when the institution is hard pressed by other similar issues in South Africa, the Portuguese colonies in southern Africa and Rhodesia.

It is interesting to speculate how different the history of the next few years might have been had the applicants prevailed. It would have been difficult for members of the Security Council to avoid the responsibility for supporting the rule of law had South Africa defied the judgment.

It is almost inevitable that the judgment and its implications will have a profound effect on the future of all of southern Africa, a region where the interlocking destinies of several minority governments have effectively created one "southern Africa problem" which presents cumulative difficulties far greater than the sum of its parts.

Furthermore, the judgment may well be unjustifiably used in support of South African reliance on article 2, paragraph 7, of the charter (the "domestic jurisdiction" clause) as to matters relating to South Africa itself. It is almost certain to be used as such within the republic: the reasoning being that, if states in the "outside world" have no legal right or interest in performance of obligations under the mandate, what right or interest could they have with respect to policies within South Africa? One may speculate further

²⁴ *I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p. 132.

²⁵ Ernest A. Gross, "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October, 1966), pp. 36-48.

²⁶ See *The New York Times*, November 4, 1966, and "Issues Before the 21st General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 559 (September, 1966), p. 66, footnote 13.

that internal South African policies will become increasingly repressive and the government will be increasingly self-confident.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Serious changes have already been felt within the territory. Native South West African political leaders have been detained for the first time under the Suppression of Communism Act. New South African legislation applies Draconian sabotage and detention provisions to the territory. South Africa is now proceeding apace with the implementation of the "Bantustan" plans for South West Africa proposed by the Odendaal Commission in 1964²⁷—plans held at least partially in abeyance pending the court decision.

The most important result of the 1966 judgment to date is of course the resolution adopted in November, 1966, by a nearly-unanimous General Assembly,²⁸ which declared that South Africa "has, in fact, disavowed the mandate"; the General Assembly has decided that the mandate "is therefore terminated . . . and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations."²⁹ The resolution proceeded to establish an *ad hoc* committee for South West Africa, for the purpose of recommending

. . . practical means by which South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session as soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967. . . .

The key to the substance of this resolution is the concept of "disavowal" of the mandate by South Africa, cogently expressed by the representative of Liberia in the debate in the General Assembly:

²⁷ *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs*, R.P. No. 12/1964.

²⁸ Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, was adopted by a vote of 114 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa) with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi, and the United Kingdom).

²⁹ G.A.O.R. 21st Sess. (A/RES/2145 (XXI)/Rev. 1), 22 November 1966, p. 3.

³⁰ Secretary of State J. Rudolph Grimes of Liberia: G.A.O.R. 21st Sess. (A/PV.1433), 7 October 1966, p. 93.

We cannot accept the contention that it is open to the Mandatory unilaterally to deny and disclaim its obligations under the Mandate and at the same time hold on to rights which, as the Court said in 1962, were entrusted to South Africa as mere tools to enable it to fulfill its obligations.³⁰

The report of the *ad hoc* committee, and the action taken at the forthcoming special session, will be of the greatest interest. A confrontation with South Africa appears to be unavoidable, unless prior confrontation within the United Nations—between the majority in the General Assembly and the powers holding financial control—results in a deadlock. As far as the United States is concerned, world opinion on Vietnam may militate for vigorous support of United Nations action elsewhere; yet domestic concern over foreign involvement may produce a precisely opposite force. The effectiveness of any action by the United Nations in South Africa will depend, in the last analysis, upon the willingness of the great powers to see it through. If nothing results, the effect upon the weakened organization will be divisive and may, at the present stage of its affairs, be critical. In that event, the surprising disposition of the South West Africa cases by the court may assume tragic proportions.

By its decision, the judicial organ of the United Nations has destroyed the possibility that this issue could be cast in the form of a judicial decision and adherence to the rule of law, and has remanded the matter to other organs of the United Nations, to be disposed of by the shifting forces of the political arena.

It is to be hoped that the United Nations can meet this difficult challenge.

Keith Highet, who served as Counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia from 1963 to 1966, is a member of the New York Bar and is associated with the law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle. From 1960 to 1961 he worked in Ghana; he traveled widely in Africa under the auspices of the Africa-Asia Program of the Maxwell Center of Syracuse University, and lectured in constitutional law at the Ghana School of Law.

As this specialist sees the situation in Rhodesia, "it seems highly improbable that a privileged minority will ever willingly surrender power. Political events in Rhodesia over the past decade seem to support this view and to contradict the thinking behind present British policy."

Prospects in Rhodesia

By RICHARD BROWN

Lecturer in History, University of Sussex

RHODESIA'S DEFIANCE of British authority and of the overwhelming majority of world opinion began with a declaration consciously modeled on the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. Despite the close similarity in wording, it was notable that the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) of November 11, 1965, omitted the phrase "that all men are created equal" and made no reference to government being derived "from the consent of the governed."

Thirteen months later, in December, 1966, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was to refer to an equally important episode in American history. "The Rhodesian problem," he told Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith aboard the British warship, the *H.M.S. Tiger*, "was not unlike the United States Civil War. That, too, had started with a constitutional issue and had ended with the abolition of slavery. Similarly, the Rhodesian problem in its fundamentals was not simply a question of constitutional provisions; it was a question of African advancement."¹ This observation was part of a final warning to the leader of the illegal regime of the consequences of refusing British settlement terms.

Yet the offered settlement hardly lived up

to Wilson's inference in reference to the American Civil War. In the opinion of many observers, the terms Britain offered Rhodesia would have entrenched white rule in Rhodesia for many years to come, even if they had not been altered at some later date by a legally independent Rhodesia still politically in the hands of its white minority.

Certainly Britain's reluctance to act more decisively at this point in its relationship with Rhodesia was in part the result of domestic considerations, but the British approach to the Rhodesian problem was also deeply conditioned by the colony's unusual history and by the effect this history has had on Britain and on the position of both major racial groups in Rhodesia. Before considering Rhodesia's present prospects, it is instructive to consider why Britain has so far treated a British colonial rebellion in ways that many have considered both faltering and (since the use of force has been ruled out except in the case of a complete breakdown of law and order) cravenly lenient.

The special character of Rhodesia (until recently known as Southern Rhodesia) reflects a two-fold legacy from the past. First, alone of the British colonies in Africa, the country has never been directly administered by Britain; second, in origin as well as development, Rhodesia's closest links have always been with South Africa, from where its main legal and social influences have come. From 1890, when the white occupation of Rhodesia

¹ The course of negotiations on Rhodesia can be followed in a series of British Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. (Command Paper: London) 2073 (June, 1963); Cmnd. 2807 (November, 1965); Cmnd. 3171 (December, 1966), which covered the *Tiger* talks.

began, until 1923, the country was administered by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa (B.S.A.) Company, with only minimal supervision from London. Moreover, under the auspices of a commercial company, this colonization was essentially the extension of the existing area of white settlement in South Africa. The general expectation for many years was that the country would become the fifth province in a South African Union—an eventuality which U.D.I. may yet bring about.

When B.S.A. Company administration ended in 1923, Britain did not take control directly, as it did in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and although it pressed the Southern Rhodesia settlers (numbering only 34,000) to merge with South Africa, it accepted instead their preference for internal self-government (the African population, then numbering perhaps 1 million, was not consulted).² The settlers' decision to become largely responsible for their own affairs, in a country about the size of California and in which they were heavily outnumbered, owed a great deal to the confidence brought about by the military conquest of the indigenous inhabitants in the 1890's.

SETTLER RULE

Britain retained sufficient powers to control discriminatory legislation, but it failed to use them to prevent the entrenchment of social and economic privilege in the hands of the settlers at a time when the Africans were unable, and the rest of the world was unwilling, to offer effective opposition. White political supremacy was ensured by a qualitative franchise, and it was of enormous importance for the future that the Rhodesian settlers elected their own parliament, staffed their own civil service, and developed their own armed forces. Only in Algeria was there a situation remotely comparable, once South Africa had become independent in 1910. It meant that at the time of U.D.I. Britain faced a rebellion

in a colony for which it was legally responsible, but over which it had long exercised no real power.

After 1945, Britain continued to find it easier to attempt to influence, rather than to direct, developments in the British colonies of Central Africa. World War II had seen the growth of both primary and secondary industry in Rhodesia and the beginnings of an economic boom that lasted until the late 1950's and was accompanied by a vastly accelerated rate of white immigration. In the decade after 1945, the white population more than doubled. Although Rhodesia remained basically an underdeveloped country, white settlers came to enjoy a standard of living unobtainable outside North America—one dependent on their monopoly of political power. Their political ambitions were subsequently directed to dominating the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which had been set up in 1953 in response to pressure from the settlers.³

Undervaluing the African opposition which was to destroy the federation, Britain had agreed to its establishment in the hope that federation would not only create a stronger economic unit but would also neutralize the growth of black and white nationalism. In fact, the existence of the federation and developments elsewhere on the African continent only accentuated the struggle between white and black in Central Africa. Britain's direct control of the administrations in Zambia and Malawi enabled it (under pressure from their African nationalist movements) to ensure relatively smooth transitions to majority rule and independence.

With the exception of the much earlier case of South Africa in 1910, majority rule had been a precondition for the grant of independence to British colonies. African nationalists inside Britain and throughout the continent, as well as liberals in Britain and elsewhere, insisted that this formula should also apply in Rhodesia. If it were not applied, they argued, Rhodesia would become another South Africa and the boundary of white supremacy would be drawn at the Zambesi River instead of at the Limpopo.

² In July, 1965, the official population estimates were 4,070,000 Africans; 219,500 Europeans; 8,000 Asians; 12,700 Coloreds (those of mixed ancestry).

³ The Federation was dissolved in 1963; Northern Rhodesia became Zambia and Nyasaland became Malawi.

At the same time, however, Britain faced a strong demand by the Rhodesian whites for independence on the basis of their existing minority constitution.

Despite British hopes to the contrary, it seems highly improbable that a privileged minority will ever willingly surrender power. Political events in Rhodesia over the past decade seem to support this view, and to contradict the thinking behind present British policy. When, in 1957, Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd indicated the need for an extension of the franchise to allow more Africans to vote, he was removed from office by his own party. When his successor, Sir Edgar Whitehead, proposed substantial breaches in the apparatus of discrimination in 1962, he met with electoral defeat by the newly-formed Rhodesian Front (R.F.), dedicated to "the Rhodesian way of life."

BUILDUP TO U.D.I.

Thereafter events moved swiftly. The rise of the Rhodesian Front in reaction to pressure on the whites to break with their past was a clear indication of the defensive and uncompromising mood of the white electorate.⁴ As Smith later told the British prime minister, the new governing party "did not believe in majority rule";⁵ and although the word "apartheid" was not used, *Principles and Policies*, the published policy statement of 1962, clearly showed that the R. F.'s political philosophy closely mirrored that of South Africa.⁶ No one then living in Rhodesia doubted that the demand for inde-

pendence was intended to perpetuate white supremacy. The threat of U.D.I., which first arose in 1963, was part of a long-established trend. The illegal declaration two years later intensified rather than originated the Rhodesian problem, and forced a reluctant Britain to clarify its position.

In the long buildup to illegal action, Ian Smith had more than once suggested that U.D.I. would be no more than a week-end wonder, and that such a unilateral action would quickly be accepted by at least some countries and would lead to substantially increased foreign investment. None of these predictions came true.

For its part, Britain's perplexity at the way the situation developed was clearly shown by the way in which its initial stand that "Rhodesia's future course cannot be negotiated with the regime which illegally claims to govern the country"⁷ was first modified and then abandoned. Wilson drastically exaggerated the effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy; this exaggeration led to his ill-advised statement at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Lagos in January, 1966, to the effect that the rebellion would be over in a matter of weeks. Even more seriously—since this is the heart of the inherent weakness in British policy toward Rhodesia—he gravely overestimated the extent to which effective opposition to Smith would be organized inside the white community.

THREE ALTERNATIVES

In the debate over British policy, three positions can be identified. The simplest view, and the one which appeals most to those for whom the consciousness of "kith and kin" is uppermost, is to concede the field to Smith and retire from the struggle altogether. This view was rejected by the Conservatives while in office and by the Labour Party when it came to power in 1964, not least because of the likely effects of such a policy on Britain's relations with the Commonwealth and the whole Afro-Asian world. In opposition, the Conservative standpoint has undoubtedly been more

⁴ See my earlier article on these developments in *Current History* (April, 1965), pp. 201-206.

⁵ *Southern Rhodesia*, 1965, Cmnd. 2807, p. 73. Smith went on to state that it was accepted that majority rule would ultimately occur, but U.D.I. and his sand in subsequent negotiations hardly bear this out.

⁶ e.g., "It must be recognised that the African and European peoples have different philosophies and ways of life, and a policy is now advanced in which neither group is forced to live under a system nor in a manner alien to the group concept." Much reference was made to "community development," but as envisaged and in a situation already segregated it resembled the "Group Areas" concept in South Africa.

⁷ Statement to the House of Commons, January 25, 1966.

equivocal. It should be stressed, however, that despite the initial rejection of an abdication policy, it is likely to gain increasing support as the rebellion drags on and was, according to some interpretations, implicit in the *Tiger* terms.

A second view, the reverse of the first, sees the wresting of power from the white minority as the only honorable and realistic solution. Supporters of this view argue that Britain's refusal to use force has artificially inflated the strength of the rebel regime. They do not believe that the white minority will ever willingly accept racial equality; thus they feel that a period of direct British rule in Rhodesia is essential to reverse past developments and break the deadlock between the white and black communities. In their view, U.D.I., is more the symptom than the cause of the Rhodesian problem.

Between these two alternatives is a third position, which the British government has sought to occupy. Haunted perhaps by the state of the British economy and by fear of provoking a split in public opinion such as occurred at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, it has consistently looked for a relatively painless way out of the Rhodesian dilemma which would nevertheless meet the view that Britain has obligations to discharge in Rhodesia. It has therefore rejected intervention, and has attempted instead to induce the white Rhodesians themselves to undertake the transition to majority rule. From 1963 until the Smith regime turned down the *Tiger* settlement, it pursued this policy by laying down five—later six—principles that would have to be met for a legal grant of independence.⁸ As the principles

were couched in general terms, a great deal of time was taken up in argument about what their implementation involved and, although they failed to produce an agreement, the basic attitude which led to their formulation remains. It seems still to be the belief of the British government that the white minority in Rhodesia will in the end allow a transfer of power from white to black; thus Britain's aim (now that all offers of independence before majority rule have been withdrawn) is merely to restore Rhodesia to constitutional rule.

That the December, 1966, talks on board the *Tiger* took place at all was a recognition that the Rhodesian situation after the unilateral declaration of independence had developed in ways that neither side had expected. Rhodesia's rejection of the *Tiger* terms marked a new stage in the struggle. In accordance with the undertakings at the second Commonwealth conference in September, Britain then withdrew all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and declared that henceforth independence would not be granted before majority rule. Previously, the absence of this important pledge, and Britain's willingness to consider proposals which would make Rhodesia legally independent before there was an African majority in the legislature, had been major causes of friction between Britain and the African members of the Commonwealth.

Unless broken, this pledge would appear to rule out further negotiation with the illegal regime, the only way to a solution in British eyes now being the acceptance by a legal Rhodesian government (i.e., one recognizing the legally British-appointed governor) of Rhodesia's 1961 constitution.

Moreover, as a further consequence of the rejection of the *Tiger* terms, Britain sponsored the December 16, 1966, resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations imposing selective mandatory economic sanctions, including oil, against Rhodesia. Thus the United Nations embarked upon what Lord Caradon, the British representative at the United Nations, called "an unprecedented course," involving a virtually

⁸ "(i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed. (ii) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. (iii) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. (iv) There would have to be progress toward ending racial discrimination. (v) The British need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. (vi) The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority." Cmnd. 3171, p. 3.

complete compulsory boycott by all members of all Rhodesian export staples except coal and manufactured goods (items considered vital to the economy of neighboring Zambia). In the view of the British prime minister, the United Nations "could not afford to lose; and other powerful countries could not afford to let it lose." However, Britain's African critics remained unconvinced that sanctions were practicable in the absence of a naval blockade against the whole of southern Africa—since South Africa had already made it clear that she did not intend to honor the United Nations instruction.

Whether Ian Smith and his colleagues acted with justified self-confidence or incredible folly in refusing the British offer of a settlement is unlikely to become clear for some time, perhaps even several years. Assessing how justified this Rhodesian confidence really is presents many difficulties.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

One of these difficulties is the position of African nationalism. In considering its prospects, its weakness is most significant. At first sight, the sustained defiance by a white community no larger than the population of many an English town seems barely credible, especially when account is also taken of the fact that it is outnumbered by an African population approximately 19 times larger. The historical circumstances which put white settlers in such a strong position in Rhodesia had the reverse result for Africans.

Decisively conquered in the 1890's, the Africans were thereafter much more closely controlled and administered in Rhodesia than in the colonies to the north. Just as African political movements in South Africa, despite their early beginnings, have been frustrated by legal means and have been driven increasingly into bitter underground methods by the official policy of repression, so the same is true, with modifications, in Rhodesia. The formidable difficulties of organizing illegal movements have not been very successfully overcome.⁹ (Both Joshua

Nkomo, the leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, and N. Sithole, the leader of the rival Zimbabwe African National Union, along with many lower-level leaders, have been in continuous detention since both organizations were banned in August, 1964.)

Undoubtedly, the persistence of a division among Africans—one based more on personalities than on aims or methods—has helped to weaken African morale inside Rhodesia. The split has also probably reduced the amount of support that the nationalists could have expected to receive from elsewhere in Africa. The leaders in other African countries and in organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) have made no secret of their dismay at the failure of the many attempts to reconcile the two political organizations, which appear to have devoted nearly as much of their energies to warring between themselves as confronting their common enemy.

In relation to the independence issue, the African nationalists have lost considerable sympathy in Western countries because of the split, their refusal to participate in constitutional politics, and their demand for immediate majority rule. Wilson made this clear in no uncertain terms when he was allowed to see the two detained leaders during his last-minute visit to Rhodesia before U.D.I. However, the intransigence of the nationalists on the constitutional issue is not hard to understand, based as it is on an awareness of the political realities in Rhodesia. They believe that no settlement which leaves the whites in effective control can guarantee whether—or at what rate—majority rule would be established, since this in turn would depend on the rate of African advancement. As long as opportunities for education and employment are controlled by whites, this advancement will be retarded.

Thus, the African nationalists will continue to insist on majority rule. They cite South Africa as an example of how unrepresentative parliamentary institutions can perpetuate minority rule and overcome consti-

⁹ See footnote 4.

tutional safeguards. Only a direct British administration within Rhodesia (they have let it be known privately) would induce them to agree to cooperate in a phased transfer of power. But, since such a British commitment seems improbable, both of the nationalist organizations-in-exile see themselves as engaged in overthrowing the present political structure by violent means.

Conflicting claims and censorship in Rhodesia make it difficult to assess what effect the infiltration of guerrilla fighters has had on the situation inside Rhodesia. So far it would seem that many, if not most, of the guerrillas have been captured without great difficulty by highly trained and efficient security forces. Any likelihood of a successful general rising of Africans against the Smith regime can probably be discounted. By abandoning the attempt to implement unpopular agrarian measures in the rural areas, the government has insulated itself from some of the unpopularity of its predecessors, while in the urban areas the compulsory removal of unemployed Africans, the dependence of Africans on European employers at a time of labor surplus, and close police surveillance combine to keep the Africans passive.

WHITE OPPOSITION

Nor does white opposition appear to present any real threat to the Rhodesian Front. Though ineffective, opposition to the illegality of the regime has come from the judiciary and from the governor, who has been treated contemptuously as a private citizen. The governor "dismissed" the Smith government. The judges subsequently ruled that both the government and the new constitution it had implemented were illegal, but that since the government was the *de facto* administration its authority must be accepted. As long as the regime continues to believe that Britain will in the end be forced to resume negotiations, it is unlikely to move against the judges. A more likely move is the declaration of a republic as a further assertion of the *de facto* independence of the

country, perhaps preceded by a referendum of the mainly white electorate as a further demonstration of the solid support that whites continue to give to the R.F. It is notable that the only times, since U.D.I., when Smith's position as leader of the party has been doubted have coincided with signs that he might be weakening on the question of accepting British terms.

Despite Smith's claim at the time of U.D.I. that "We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation, and Christianity . . .," opposition to U.D.I. was expressed by the leaders of all the main churches. The five Roman Catholic bishops called the claim a "hideous mockery,"¹⁰ but such expressions of disapproval have had little or no observable effect on the mass of white opinion, which has continued to support Smith with intense emotional fervor. There have been ripples of discontent from businessmen concerned about the possible cumulative effect of economic sanctions. Yet the farmers, who have been the hardest hit by sanctions, remain unswervingly loyal to the Rhodesian Front.

Encouraged by government propaganda, hatred of Britain in general and of Harold Wilson in particular is widespread. The settlers have been taught to believe, against all the evidence, that surrender to Britain means *immediate* majority rule; and government propaganda has further instilled the idea that African government would mean total ruin. With radio and television under government control and all publications under strict censorship, the public's view of the rest of Africa is a distorted stereotype. In these circumstances, the majority of whites do not see any alternative to supporting Smith; moreover, they are buoyed by the

(Continued on page 182)

Prior to assuming his position at the new University of Sussex, **Richard Brown** served as a research assistant for the History of Parliament Trust in London and subsequently, in 1958, joined the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

¹⁰ *Guardian*, November 29, 1965.

Commenting on the current clash of wills between the Mobutu regime and the Union Minière, this specialist observes that "Whatever the outcome of the conflict, . . . the most fascinating development in the 14-month history of the Mobutu regime remains its stunning mutation from oligarchic conservatism to emotional nationalism."

Confrontation in the Congo

By EDOUARD BUSTIN

Associate Professor of Government, Boston University

WHEN GENERAL JOSEPH DESIRÉ MOBUTU cut the Gordian knot of Congolese politics in November, 1965, by sweeping out that country's leading political contenders, President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Moïse Tshombé, the script seemed only too familiar and—to many observers—appropriate for a country which had gone through the sequence of contemporary political vicissitudes with tragicomical rapidity. Then, in quick succession, a half-dozen African regimes suffered similar convulsions and, for the first time in many years, the Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) press could indulge in the bittersweet irony of watching neighboring countries seemingly take a lead from the oft-berated Congo.

Outside observers, barely pausing to size up the dents in their latest theories, went busily back to the drawing boards to churn out fresh generalizations on *l'Afrique des militaires*, and the wheels were soon turning as usual in all informed craniums. As it happens, apart from a crude similarity of techniques, military coups in sub-Saharan Africa have little enough in common unless one is willing to overlook crucial differences in the political significance of military take-overs in, say, Ghana, Nigeria, the Central African Republic and the Congo.

Oddly enough, it is the Congo, after a notoriously unconvincing record of experi-

mentation with political systems, that today demonstrates the best cooperative relationship between its political forces. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that the Mobutu regime is in many ways the most "civilian" of tropical Africa's military regimes. President Mobutu's personal background suggests a partial explanation for this phenomenon. Never a professional soldier (his early association with the *Force Publique* can hardly be described as having been voluntary), Mobutu came to the army through politics after an undistinguished career in small-time journalism. His appointment to the general staff by Premier Patrice Lumumba was intended to turn him into something of a political commissar, as the Congo's first premier sought (with good reason, but without success) to extend his government's control over the not yet decolonized *Force Publique*.

With outside advice and assistance, Mobutu was able to expand his ambiguous footing into an independent power base—a base which he soon used against Lumumba himself. The highly political nature of Mobutu's link to the army was thus evident from the very moment of his appearance in the public light. To view him, as one senior official of the Belgian foreign ministry allegedly did, as "an ex-sergeant who thinks he can solve all problems by referring to the infantryman's manual" is to be guilty of gross misevaluation.

Mobutu is no Congolese equivalent of the Sandhurst- or Saint Cyr-educated officers who have risen to power in some formerly British or French territories. Comradeship-in-arms and esprit de corps play comparatively little part in his relationship with his fellow officers (most of whom rose from the ranks in any case). In short, Mobutu is not a general turned politician, but a politician turned general.

Like most African politicians—indeed, like politicians the world over—Mobutu based his career on the support of a loyal core of followers. In the Congo, such a power base has usually been ethnic, or at least regional. For Mobutu, however, whose own tribe is an unimportant frontier group, the army served the same purpose.¹ Like other Congolese politicians (even the most regionally-oriented, like Kasavubu or Tshombe), Mobutu rapidly recognized the need to broaden his political base by mobilizing nationwide support for his policies. This was especially imperative for him (indeed for any would-be military “strong man”) because of the invidious place of the army in Congolese society. This problem is not limited to the Congo alone and it affects military regimes throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

THE ARMY'S ROLE

Western observers attempting to assess African military coups frequently tend to be unduly influenced by memories of Turkey's Ataturk or Egypt's Nasser and to conclude that the army's role in a developing country is invariably that of a modernizing, integrative force. Yet the military's capacity to act as an instrument of national mobilization de-

pends to a considerable extent upon its actual record as an authentic champion of national integrity. The Turkish, Egyptian and Algerian military came to power in the wake of campaigns to drive out a foreign power, an achievement that earned them popular gratitude and support.

It hardly needs to be pointed out that no sub-Saharan African army can advance such claims to the people's loyalty. Except for minor border incidents, none of them has been called upon to defend its country's independence against external invasion or attempted colonial reconquest. None of them emerged, like the Algerian A.L.N. (National Army of Liberation), from an armed struggle for national liberation. As a matter of fact, none of their elements played any significant part in nationalist politics under colonial rule.

On the contrary, the traditions which most of the armies of Africa have continued to uphold have been those of a colonial police force. This is especially true of the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (A.N.C.), whose record of heavy-handed repression dates back to the days of the Congo Free State, making it more reminiscent of Porfirio Díaz's notorious *rurales* than of the Algerian *moudjahiddin*.^{*} A Congolese villager who instinctively takes to the bush whenever an A.N.C. contingent is reported moving along the road can hardly be expected to feel any deep-seated sense of identification with “his” national army or its leaders.

Against this background, Mobutu's initial reaction upon coming into power was an unimaginative reiteration of the techniques used by many of his Latin American counterparts—namely, the exploitation of popular feeling against a discredited political class and the rather clumsy use of propaganda to refurbish the army's image.

Both moves met with indifferent success. Mobutu's strike against the political class (the psychological effect of which was mostly limited to the capital) was almost anticlimactic, to the extent that the Leopoldville populace had long been aware of its corruption and inefficiency. Indeed, the regime's overreaction to a plot by some of the dises-

¹ The analogy is apt, since the members of the *Force Publique* had been explicitly encouraged by the Belgians to think of themselves as “a separate tribe.” It should not, however, be carried too far: many instances of resurgent ethnic loyalties within the army since 1960 have abundantly demonstrated that its cohesion was not to be taken for granted. Mobutu's own efforts have consistently sought to build up or preserve the unity of the army at all costs—even to the extent of conducting covert negotiations with dissident regimes.

^{*} Editor's note: The reference is to Mexican dictator Díaz's rural constabulary and the Algerian freedom fighters.

established politicians culminated in the public hanging of four prominent congressmen, (including Mobutu's immediate predecessor, former Premier Evariste Kimba), and came close to reversing the trend of popular feeling. Thereafter the Mobutu regime gradually abandoned its policy of deliberately humiliating civilian politicians.

A number of factors account for this change in the regime's policy line, some of them having to do with Mobutu's foreign policy orientations. While Mobutu was groping for domestic support, his government had made impressive strides in securing acceptance by other African nations, a field where the Tshombe regime had been notoriously deficient. In sharp contrast to Tshombe, who had never been truly accepted by independent Africa, the new government quickly mended its relations with all its neighbors. The reconciliation was formalized at the Nairobi conference of East and Central African heads of state (appropriately named the "good neighbors' conference") in April, 1966. Agreement was reached on the repatriation of refugees to their respective countries; but more significant from the Congo's viewpoint was the tacit agreement by its neighbors to stop support or tolerance of rebel activity.

A first manifestation of this new spirit of cooperation was the expulsion from East African capitals of the exiled leaders of the National Liberation Council. Another was the state visits to the Congolese capital by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, and by the vice-presidents of Uganda and Kenya. At the same time, the Congo also improved its relations with its French-speaking neighbors to the West—notably Congo (Brazzaville), long a sanctuary for oppositional activities—and, by maintaining its membership in the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache*, was able to make its voice heard in both French-speaking and English-speaking Africa. Thus it achieved a measure of the influence to which it would normally be entitled by virtue of its size, wealth and unique location at the crossroads of western, eastern and southern Africa.

A NEW POLITICAL STYLE

While predictable and to a certain extent expected (if only by contrast to the odium accumulated by Tshombe), the development of warmer relations with East Africa and Zambia also marked a decisive turning point in Mobutu's political style. It is obviously idle to speculate on the extent of the possible influence on the Congolese president by Julius Nyerere or Kenneth Kaunda, but in a continent where a leader's style of dress may often serve as a crude indicator of his political temperament (or at least of the image he likes to project), it is not irrelevant to note Mobutu's increasing preference since the spring of 1966 for the open-necked, colorfully printed shirts affected by the Zambian president and for the elaborately carved staffs sported by East African leaders.

All of this, obviously, would be insignificant if it had not coincided with Mobutu's proclamation of the need for "genuine (i.e., economic) decolonization" and with his increasingly deliberate attempt to pick up the thread of nationalist legitimacy that had lapsed after the death of Premier Patrice Lumumba. Harnessing latent nationalist militancy and, in the process, snatching Lumumba's mantle from the exiled leaders of the Congo rebellion was a daring, even brazen, operation in view of Mobutu's role in the downfall of the murdered premier. But it was also, in many ways, the only realistic course for a man whose power base had been an unreliable, unpopular pretorian guard.

Movement along these lines started in the spring of 1966. Under the Bakajika Act (named after the bill's sponsor in the national parliament but inspired by the government), forestry and mining concessions granted under Belgian rule were subjected to renegotiation—presumably on terms more favorable to the state. Foreign corporations having operations in the Congo were invited to relocate their headquarters within the country. More ominously, the Mobutu government announced in May that it would reconsider the settlement with Belgium reached by Tshombe in February, 1965, concerning the so-called *portefeuille*, —i.e., the \$350 mil-

lion worth of stocks in various corporations formerly held by the colonial government. Not only were the terms accepted by Tshombe characterized as a "sellout" of national interests, but the Congolese government noted with some acrimony that the actual transfer of some of the shares had been held up by Belgium despite the much-publicized agreement. Although the controversy involved private Belgian interest groups rather than the government, the exchange between the two capitals quickly rose to a paroxysm of vehemence in which the mass media on both sides played a particularly inflammatory part.

Despite a flurry of thinly-veiled mutual threats and minor diplomatic incidents, however, a limping sort of agreement (which turned out to be no more than a temporary cease-fire) was reached by the time the Congo celebrated the sixth anniversary of its independence in the summer of 1966. The occasion was used by President Mobutu to dramatize his regime's increasingly nationalistic stance in a fashion more symbolic than substantial. To the enthusiastic cheers of the crowd, Mobutu paid an unprecedented tribute to the memory of Patrice Lumumba and "africanized" the names of major Congolese cities: thus, Leopoldville became Kinshasa and the provincial capitals of Elisabethville, Stanleyville, Coquilhatville, Baaningville and Paulis were respectively renamed Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Bandundu and Isoro.² Yet, at the same time, the president took pains to placate leading Belgian businessmen by inducting them into the newly-created National Order of the Leopard.

MUTINY AT KISANGANI

This uneasy truce soon came to an end, however. The Belgian conservative press continued to display an ill-concealed nostalgia for the more accommodating Tshombe, prompting Mobutu to announce that "the hour of de-Tshombization" had struck for the Congo. Accordingly, the former secessionist leader was threatened with a warrant for his arrest, deprived of his seat in parliament and

forced, through Congolese diplomatic pressure, to transfer his residence from Brussels to Madrid (the seat of his earlier exile). Rumors of a Tshombe-supported plot against the Mobutu government, involving the recruitment of white mercenaries, mounted rapidly during the early part of the summer. They were substantiated on July 23, 1966, when a mutiny broke out among the Katangese regiment quartered at Kisangani.

A bizarre, two-month stalemate followed during which several Congolese notables expert in the art of fence-sitting waited in vain for Tshombe to drop the other shoe. What came instead was the uncovering by French police in mid-September of a training camp in Ardèche, France, where mercenaries alleged to be in Tshombe's employ were being trained. A few days later, the Congolese army, assisted by some white mercenaries (while others fought with the mutineers) moved in to liquidate the insurgents, whose commander was sent as prisoner to the capital.

Storm signals remained up, however. Military rule, which had been imposed on the provinces of Haut-Congo (where Kisangani is located), and South and North Katanga (the expected targets of a Tshombist coup), was continued, while civilian governors suspected of pro-Tshombe sympathies were suspended and placed under close surveillance. Foremost among these was South Katanga Governor Godefroid Munongo, Tshombe's interior minister and closest associate during the latter's tenure as "president" of secessionist Katanga and as premier of the Congo. Munongo, whose role in the Kisangani mutiny had been partly that of a hostage, partly that of a mediator, was placed under house arrest and eventually deprived of his position. Even more indicative of continuing uneasiness was the dismissal in October of Mobutu's own prime minister, General Leonard Mulamba, a well-connected, popular professional soldier whose attitude during the Kisangani episode had been rather ambiguous.

President Mobutu thereupon decided to round off the already well-advanced transformation of his regime into a presidential system by eliminating the office of prime

² Subsequently, the important mining center of Jadotville was renamed Likasi.

minister. At the same time, he pursued the dismantlement of the strongholds of provincial politicians. The number of Congolese provinces, already reduced from 21 to 12 in the early days of his administration, was brought down to 8. More important, the status of provincial governors was radically altered: instead of being elected officials, they were turned into civil servants whose posting would be determined by the central government. This amounted to the *de facto* undoing of the quasi-federal system introduced under the 1964 constitution.

At the same time, however, in an apparent attempt to mollify the political class, Mobutu restored limited powers to the national assembly. Reconciliation between the civilian and military elites received the measured but nevertheless effective endorsement of former President Kasavubu who emerged from his enforced retirement to reoccupy his senatorial seat.

Yet neither the feeling of insecurity—nor apparently its causes—had been laid to rest. Rumors of mercenaries concentrating in neighboring Angola for impending action against the Congo continued to crop up during the last quarter of 1966. The Congo's relations with Portugal deteriorated rapidly as the Congo brought charges in the United Nations Security Council, accusing Portugal of allowing its African possessions of Angola and Cabinda to be used for the staging of subversive action against the Mobutu government. (It will be remembered that Angola had indeed been used as a sanctuary by Katanga forces during and after that province's secession.)

Portugal, in turn, charged that its neighbor was tolerating incursions into Angola by Congo-based nationalist guerrilla bands. After a few border incidents, notably one confused melee at the frontier post of Texeira de Souza in which over 200 Africans were reportedly killed, Portugal closed its boundaries to all traffic with the Congo, thus jeopardizing the passage of Katanga minerals (the Congo's chief resource), the bulk of which is normally exported via the Benguela Railway and the Angola port of Lobito.

MINING INTERESTS

Serious as its repercussions might prove to be, however, the conflict with Angola paled in comparison with the Mobutu government's headlong plunge on a collision course with the almighty *Union Minière*—a conflagration likely to prove the ultimate test of strength for the Congo regime. Mobutu's clash with Belgian mining interests has long and tangled antecedents, many of which antedate Congolese independence. At stake is not only the celebrated *portefeuille*—a legacy of Belgian King Leopold II's proprietary rights and entrepreneurial skills—but also the long-unexercized power of economic control devolved by the Congo Free State to its successors. Shortly before the Congo became independent, several major corporations in which the colonial administration held a substantial share were reorganized and incorporated under Belgian law. In the confused circumstances which followed, the actual transfer of the shares to which the Congolese government was legally entitled was repeatedly postponed as Belgium insisted upon linking together the *portefeuille* issue and the wider question of the distribution of the former colony's financial liens between Belgium and the Congo.

Successive Congolese governments vainly waded through the legal morass commonly referred to as *le contentieux* and even the complaisant Tshombe, in sheer frustration, threatened to void all concessions unless the issue was finally resolved. It was settled (at least on the surface) by an agreement signed on February 6, 1965—just in time for Tshombe to open the congressional election campaign by parading through the streets of the capital with a black leather attache case said to contain (symbolically, in all likelihood) the famed *portefeuille*.

Upon coming into power, the Mobutu government reappraised the terms of the agreement and found them stiff. Furthermore, through the litigation of private shareholders (against whom the Belgian government had no official recourse) effective transfer of the shares continued to be denied by two absentee holding companies controlling the diamond-

mining *Forminière* and the gold-mining *Kilo-Moto*, in which the Congo government's interests are, respectively, 56 and 97 per cent. Exasperated by what it considered intentional chicanery, the Congo government unilaterally decided to transfer its claims against one such holding company to Belgium in lieu of its contribution to the servicing of the pre-1960 Congo debt. In the same manner, the Congo went on to suggest the exchange of cross-holdings between the Belgian and Congolese national airlines (SABENA and Air-Congo). A bitter exchange followed between Brussels and Kinshasa, with Belgium threatening to discontinue its technical assistance program to the Congo.

Another source of friction with expatriate business interests was the *Union Minière's* unilateral decision in April, 1966, to raise copper prices, following similar moves by Chile and Zambia. Though presumably exhilarated by the perspective of increased revenue, the Mobutu government was annoyed at not having been consulted about the raise—to which the *Union Minière* replied, not inaccurately, that it had never been in the habit of consulting any government about company policy. Against this background of mutual recrimination, the requirement that foreign-based corporations relocate in the Congo was initially viewed by expatriate businessmen as a minor annoyance to which they could bow more or less gracefully, sure that it would not affect their operations.

The largest corporation of them all, the *Union Minière* (admitted profits in 1965: \$774 million) prepared for the move by severing its purely Congolese mining operations in the Congo (to be conducted in the future by a Congolese corporation in which the government would hold a 50 per cent interest) from its other (mainly commercial) operations centered in Belgium. Presumably, the Congolese corporation would continue to turn over its entire mineral production to its Belgian correspondent (in which the Congo would retain an 18 per cent share). The Belgian concern, in turn, would commercialize it in its usual fashion (i.e., since 1919 through the exclusive services of the *Société*

Générale des Minerais, a Belgian company controlled—like the *Union Minière* itself and most other firms operating in the Congo—by Belgium's largest bank, the *Société Générale de Belgique*). Although it left room for possible misunderstandings (notably regarding the price to be paid to the new Congolese corporation for its mineral products), the arrangement was tentatively agreed to by the Congo government, but negotiations dragged on over most of 1966, during which time the *Union Minière* shipped to Belgium almost the entirety of its production for the year (copper production for 1966 was 310,000 tons).

Disagreement arose over the ownership of this stockpile of minerals, with the *Union Minière* arguing that all minerals located in Belgium were the exclusive property of the Belgian corporation, while the Kinshasa government invoked a recently passed act under which all mining corporations must turn over 10 per cent of their production to the state. Claiming payment of sales receipts for its share of the exported minerals as well as of other debts allegedly owed by the *Union Minière*, Mobutu threatened to seize the company's installations in the Congo. Unless a settlement were reached by December 31, he added, the Congo would cancel all *Union Minière* concessions and turn over their exploitation to a Congolese corporation in which the government would own 60 per cent of the stock (instead of the 50 per cent tentatively agreed upon by the *Union Minière* in earlier negotiations with Kinshasa). Without waiting for the deadline, the *Union Minière* announced that it would not transfer its headquarters to the Congo, and Mobutu thereupon proceeded to organize the *Société Générale Congolaise des Minerais*, which took over from *Union Minière* on January 1, 1967.

The war was on, to all appearances, and both sides attempted to rally supporters. *Union Minière* dissuaded its senior representatives in the Congo from taking up their posts on the board of the new S.G.C.M.—to which they had been appointed by the Congolese government. It also sought—and received—assurances that Tanganyika Conces-

sions, Ltd. (holder of a 14.7 per cent interest in *Union Minière*) would turn down the Congo's offer of a 15 per cent share in the new corporation. Pledges of unwavering diplomatic support were extracted from the Belgian government. Finally, in a two-pronged attack, the *Union Minière* threatened legal reprisals against anyone buying minerals from the new company and notified its expatriate personnel in Katanga that they would have to decide within a month which master they intended to serve.

Against this deployment of corporate strength, Mobutu could only appeal for mass popular support, which he proceeded to do, by declaring that the Congolese people would rather have "poverty in freedom than wealth in servitude" and by comparing the significance of his action for Africa to that of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. There was little doubt that a great number of Congolese (particularly in the cities) would respond emotionally—and positively—to this sort of language, though their readiness to accept the full rigors of economic warfare might be questioned.

From all sides, however, came indications that some sort of mediation might be attempted to deescalate a situation where both parties had painted themselves into opposite corners and where the fear of losing face had become an important factor. The Belgian cabinet publicly expressed the wish to see the conflict submitted to arbitration. At the same time, the French-language weekly *Jeune Afrique*, while calling for African solidarity in backing the Congo government, conceded that Mobutu's decision to join in a test of strength with the *Union Minière* might have been "premature and insufficiently prepared." Before reaching the stage of all-out mutual retaliations, the magazine continued, "countries friendly with the Congo and Belgium, such as Italy, France . . . and Tunisia might—and should—attempt arbitration."

Whatever the outcome of the conflict, however, the most fascinating development in the 14-month history of the Mobutu regime re-

mains its stunning mutation from oligarchic conservatism to emotional nationalism. To be sure, the history of the Congo since 1960 might be written in terms of recurrent nationalistic upsurges repeatedly contained by a conservative establishment. President Kasavubu himself, a dyed-in-the-wool "moderate," was cautiously veering toward a more radical policy line after dismissing Tshombe, when he was overthrown by the military. A similar drift has now swept Mobutu, whom many viewed first as the tool of a neocolonial restoration, so that he now appears, perhaps despite himself, as a new Lumumba. The slow fuse of nationalism continues to smolder.

Indeed, the question of how much tactical scheming entered into Mobutu's initial assumption of a nationalistic stance is increasingly academic. The forces he conjured up in his attempt to mobilize popular support behind his regime cannot be laid to rest overnight—though they may, as has happened in the past, be forcibly suppressed. Mobutu himself seemed to sense this in early January, 1967, when he remarked, somewhat fatalistically, to a Belgian journalist:³ "If the Congolese people want genuine independence and dignity, they will follow me. If the people prefer slavery and foreign exploitation, they can always give themselves another leader."

Edouard Bustin, educated at the University of Liège (Belgium), taught administrative law and comparative government at the University of the Congo (Lubumbashi) in 1959–1960. He came to the United States in 1961. Since 1963, he has been teaching at Boston University and a member of the institution's African Studies Center. For the past three years, he has made annual visits to the Congo (Kinshasa), where he holds the post of *Professeur Extraordinaire* at the Faculty of Social Science and Economics of the University of the Congo. His publications include a book in French on local government and political change in British East Africa, a monograph in Gwendolen Carter (ed.) *Five African States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), and many articles on African politics.

³ *Spécial* (Brussels), January 5, 1967.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Treaty on the Exploration of Space

At a White House ceremony on January 27, 1967, 62 nations signed the first international treaty to govern the exploration of space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. The treaty is to become effective after ratification by at least five member nations including the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. The text of the treaty follows:

The states parties to this treaty,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development,

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between states and peoples,

Recalling Resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space," which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 13, 1963,

Recalling Resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon states to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on Oct. 17, 1963,

Taking account of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 110 (II) of Nov. 3, 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,

Convinced that a treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other cele-

tial bodies, will further the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and states shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

ARTICLE 2

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

ARTICLE 3

States parties to the treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

ARTICLE 4

States parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of

mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

ARTICLE 5

States parties to the treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another state party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the state of registry of their space vehicle.

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one state party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other states parties.

States parties to the treaty shall immediately inform the other states parties to the treaty or the Secretary General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.

ARTICLE 6

States parties to the treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present treaty. The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the state concerned. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the states parties to the treaty participating in such organization.

ARTICLE 7

Each state party to the treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer

space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each state party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another state party to the treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

ARTICLE 8

A state party to the treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space, including the body, or by their return to the earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the state party to the treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that state, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

ARTICLE 9

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, states parties to the treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other states parties to the treaty. States parties to the treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a state party to the treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other states parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A state party to the treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another state party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other

celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

ARTICLE 10

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this treaty, the states parties to the treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other states parties to the treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those states.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the states concerned.

ARTICLE 11

In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, states parties to the treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

ARTICLE 12

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of the other states parties to the treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

ARTICLE 13

The provisions of this treaty shall apply to the activities of states parties to the treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single state party to the treaty or jointly with other states, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations.

Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the states parties to the treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more state

members of that international organization, which are parties to this treaty.

ARTICLE 14

1. This treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Social Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the depositary governments.

3. This treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this treaty.

4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

6. This treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15

Any state party to the treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each state party to the treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the states parties to the treaty and thereafter for each remaining state party to the treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE 16

Any state party to the treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

ARTICLE 17

This treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.

BOOK REVIEWS

On Africa

DREAM OF UNITY: PAN-AFRICANISM AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION IN WEST AFRICA. BY CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. 357 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.00.)

After some general background on aspects of African unity, Claude Welch discusses four case studies of political unification attempts: the Ewe, the Cameroun Federal Republic, "Senegambia," and the defunct Union of African States. These studies are based upon careful research and bring to light a wealth of little known details; a paperbound edition would make the study more easily accessible to students. The author's conclusions are that political unification in West Africa is unlikely, and that moves toward unity will follow functional, step-by-step lines. The concluding discussion uses criteria from various frameworks and suggests that these are of marginal usefulness in an African context.

W. A. E. Skurnik
University of Colorado

AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS. BY JOAN DAVIES (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1966. 231 pages, bibliography, glossary and index, \$1.25 paperbound.)

Joan Davies offers a welcome study at a time when African trade unions are increasingly asserting themselves. Eight substantive chapters discuss the pre- and post-independence period as well as the impact of international affiliation. The author recognizes the need for governments to have some control over unions, and points out that unions are either in opposition or agents for increasing production and/or consumption. The strategic location and

economic importance of unions enable them to act as political irritants capable on occasion of bringing down a government; but they cannot be major political forces since they have no mass appeal. W.S.

FALSE START IN AFRICA. BY RENÉ DUMONT. (New York: Praeger, 1966. 303 pages and appendices, \$7.00.)

One of the most responsible critical reviews of independent Africa, this study was written by an agronomist with a social conscience and much sympathy for peasants. The author believes that substantial progress toward economic independence can, given the effort required, be made in 20 years. Although the book first appeared in French in 1962, John Hatch has added a chapter on English-speaking Africa; the book is welcome and timely, as witness some African leaders who have recently recommended it to their people. W.S.

NATIONAL UNITY AND REGIONALISM IN EIGHT AFRICAN STATES. EDITED BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. 555 pages, maps and index, \$10.00.)

The third—and last—volume in the series edited by Professor Carter, this book is designed to fill the large gaps in basic information available to the student. The present volume includes chapters on Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Ethiopia, and one on the four French-speaking Equatorial states. They are all written by specialists who have done considerable field research, and the book is above the caliber of the average textbook. A conclusion reviews the major problems and prospects of the new African states. W.S.

POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE: A STUDY OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS IN SIERRA LEONE. BY MARTIN L. KILSON (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. 289 pages, maps, tables, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

This is a thorough history of social and political change induced by Britain, with special emphasis on rural areas. The author carefully reviews the inception and development of colonial rule, focusing on the response by traditional and modern elites and on institutions, then discusses contemporary politics. The theme is that "fundamental political innovation occurs in response to the endeavor of the colonial oligarchy . . . to create and maintain . . . a market or money economy," an endeavor leading to the dispersal of political power which facilitates the emergence of a modern elite that is chiefly bureaucratic and manipulative.

W.S.

THE MYTH OF MAU MAU: NATIONALISM IN KENYA. BY CARL G. ROSEBERG, JR., and JOHN NOTTINGHAM (New York: Praeger [for the Hoover Institution], 1966. 354 pages, bibliography, index, maps and illustrations, \$7.50.)

This study offers a reinterpretation of the growth and meaning of nationalism in Kenya. The first 8 chapters survey the origins and characteristics of black African nationalism in Kenya from the 1880's to independence. The other two chapters discuss the "myth" and "reality" of Mau Mau. The myth, which resulted from the failure to separate form from content, includes three interrelated notions: that the colonial administration was willing and able to respond constructively to social and political grievances, that Mau Mau was a mere additional instance of an African religious movement, and that Mau Mau methods demonstrated a return to African traditions.

The reality is that Mau Mau was an instrument designed essentially to question

the legitimacy of colonial rule and to wrest political power from the colonial oligarchy. It was built on a Kikuyu base because only that group had articulated grievances, mostly concerning land alienation. Attempts were made to use similar methods with other ethnic groups and thus to widen the base of protest, but these failed for various reasons. As a result the Kikuyu are the most highly politicized group in Kenya, and the problems of national integration will continue to challenge that country's political leaders.

W.S.

AFRICA. BY WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN (New York: Atheneum [New York Times Byline Book], 1966. 161 pages and index, \$3.95 cloth, \$1.65 paperbound.)

This is an easy introduction to an understanding of contemporary Africa. Six of the eleven chapters discuss background, social, economic and political problems. The other chapters cover three trouble areas—the Congo (Kinshasa), South Africa, and other lands under white domination—as well as the dynamics of Africa's international behavior. The author's mood is warmly sympathetic and optimistic; he brings unusual clarity to complex issues, includes a (hypothetical?) discussion with two African leaders, and ends with a cogent plea for better understanding between Africans and Americans.

W.S.

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER: THE PARTY-STATES OF WEST AFRICA. BY ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. 161 pages and index, \$2.50 paperbound.)

One of the best recent books on Africa, this study reexamines a number of current conceptions, deepens our perception of Africa, and suggests a host of useful areas for further investigation. By focusing on the dominant parties from their humble beginnings to their present preponderance, Zolberg finds that elaborate ideologies and party and government structures remain

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AFRICA IN THE WORLD ARENA

(Continued from page 135)

ened" the O.A.U. The very fact that it was actually held was cause for jubilation in some quarters. For the first time, the heads-of-state assembly dispensed with its set procedure of public speeches. Rather, plenary debates were conducted in closed session, with more of the give and take so necessary for genuine compromise. But, at best, the Accra summit was an exercise in cooperation and compromise on foreign policy matters. It cannot be regarded as an exhibition of unity along the lines the activists envision.

Shortly afterwards, on November 12, 1965, the Smith government announced U.D.I. for Rhodesia. Foreign ministers and defense ministers of 35 O.A.U. states (Gambia was absent) met in Addis Ababa to decide how to proceed. In an emotional atmosphere it was resolved unanimously (although with some difficulty) that, if Great Britain did not crush the Rhodesian rebellion by December 15 (less than two weeks away), all O.A.U. members would break off diplomatic relations with Britain. The results were disastrous. The presidents of Tunisia and Upper Volta publicly disavowed their foreign ministers' decisions. A statement by the Nigerian foreign minister was also officially corrected. Most other members reserved the right to interpret the resolution flexibly. Between December 15 and 19, only nine states broke with Britain—Ghana and Tanzania (of the Commonwealth), and Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan and the U.A.R. By taking hasty action without consulting their capitals, the ministers had seriously weakened the credibility of the organization. Further dissension surfaced at the sixth ordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers (February 28 to March 6, 1966) where 8 of the 36 members walked out in protest. The 1966 summit conference at Addis Ababa in November deepened the splits. The dispute between Ghana and Guinea dominated the proceedings and it was only Rhodesia's continued defiance of

the Africans that held the conference together.

The collective approach to Africa's problems is not solidly engrained. The O.A.U. continues to exist, but its record is checkered. The possibility of a return to the old bloc politics of the 1960–1963 period is real and might develop within the context of the O.A.U. itself. Few Africans wish to see the disappearance of the O.A.U. But its future depends primarily on the nature of the issues that arise. If bilateral, nonideological intra-African issues crop up, they may be subject to resolution or mitigation. But ideological issues arouse more widespread interest and could possibly present the O.A.U. with divisive pressures the African states and the O.A.U. would be unable to handle. Clearly, African unity is fragile. The dreams of the continent are no closer to fulfillment than they were in 1963.

INDEPENDENT POLICIES

It remains clear that African states jealously guard their independence, limited as it may be, against all challenges. In the three-cornered East-West competition, no power has been able to dominate the continent, though the West and particularly the ex-colonial powers seem to have been and continue to be the most successful in exerting influence.

Further, this is not a simple three-cornered game. The Africans are themselves acting as well as being acted upon. Moreover, there is no real "balancing" of influence. Rather, the European powers and increasingly the United States have an advantage. Peking and Moscow are hardly of the same magnitude except—and this is an important exception from an American perspective—in a few selected countries. What is really amazing is that, in spite of their almost total economic dependence on the West, some African states have managed to take rather independent international courses. If unity could be fostered or if new, more powerful groupings developed, Africans would be in an even better position to resist external pressures and conduct more independent foreign policies.

NORTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 141)

could open a Pandora's box of Balkanization throughout the region, with ethnic and tribal groups opting for independent status in other African states with substantial minorities of their own.

More troublesome have been Saharan boundary rectification claims, particularly those pressed by Morocco to include portions of Algeria, all of Spanish Sahara and much of present-day Mauritania. The disputed area would bring almost one million people and over two million square miles under Moroccan suzerainty. Thus far, however, most independent African states have stood behind the principles of the O.A.U. charter requiring respect for colonially-inherited frontiers and the resolution of disagreements through negotiation or mediation.

On balance, North Africa would appear to be shifting away from its earlier alliance arrangements, which were predicated largely upon ideological considerations. Greater weight is being given to such practical needs as trade, transport and communications. As a result, there will probably be an early consolidation of already developing ties in these fields. Within the political realm, occasional upsets cannot be ruled out; however, the greater the degree of economic interdependence of the Arab North and sub-Saharan Africa, the less likely it is that future imbroglios will result in conflict and political polarization.

NIGERIA

(Continued from page 148)

more than with the effervescence of younger Africans. Open solicitation of British advice during the January crisis, and Ojukwu's preference of Commonwealth to African security forces, indicate that these leaders were perhaps unaware of their preferences' implications regarding Nigerian self-respect.

Compared with other African states which recently came under military rule, the prob-

lems of Nigeria are not uncommon; others face the stress of ethnic and regional diversity, corruption, suppression of opposition, and tensions between progressive and traditional elements (in fact most others have grave economic problems). What seems to distinguish Nigeria is the fortuitous chain of circumstances which raised the intensity of some of these problems beyond the threshold of tolerance and simultaneously thrust into national leadership military officers who at first were just not "with it." A quick return to civilian rule seems likely in Nigeria. Elsewhere similar political forces are reasserting themselves, and it would be surprising if Nigeria were to prove an exception. The magnitude of the crisis of 1966 churned up issues of such fundamental importance that, after passions have cooled, a renovated Nigeria could very well emerge.

GHANA

(Continued from page 153)

While the Left was expressing bewilderment and disillusion with events in Ghana, conservative financiers were expressing similar sentiments with respect to the turmoil which broke out in another West African country, Nigeria, in the course of 1966. It was evident to both that the myth according to which Ghana was a showcase for socialism, and Nigeria another for capitalism, was a delusion, born and encouraged—albeit from different viewpoints—by the psychological warriors of the cold war. Reality—West African reality—finally smashed the myth, so that all concerned were obligated to view the situation in terms of facts, not in terms of illusions created by either wishes or fears.

The experience has been a sobering one—for Ghanaians no less than for other interested parties. Anyone who would venture too confidently to predict what course events in Ghana may take would clearly be presumptuous, given the uncertainties facing not merely West Africa but the ever more closely interrelated world community. But, should no uncontrollable situation develop elsewhere—in the Far East, or in southern Africa, for

example—there would appear to be good reason to hope that Ghana will be able to look forward, in another year or two, to a period of economic and industrial expansion and of social progress in which it will surpass its not inconsiderable past achievements.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 179)

very much on the surface of the societies which they seek to control. The book covers mainly five countries but its substance is relevant to all of black Africa.

W.S.

RHODESIA

(Continued from page 167)

conviction that they can win because they believe that Portugal and, more importantly, South Africa will give them unqualified support. And they remain confident that Britain would rather fail in her aim of restoring constitutional rule, than risk the economic confrontation with South Africa which they feel would be necessary to make economic sanctions against Rhodesia crippling.

Change in Rhodesia, if it is to occur, is likely to be sudden. Either economic collapse or effective political challenge might take place dramatically. Totalitarian conditions prevent an effective challenge taking place with advance warning, and the government will continue to conceal the real state of the economy as long as possible in the hope of tiring the sanctioners into calling off the siege. Under the circumstances, what the future holds is most likely to turn on the continued effect of the economic sanctions. Because sanctions have brought no quick results there has been a tendency to underestimate or overlook their cumulative effect. Nonetheless, it is clear that sanctions will have to do more than merely damage the economy if they are to have any effect.

Superficially, the economy of Rhodesia looks highly vulnerable to sanctions because of its traditional heavy dependence on ex-

ports to pay for goods not produced within the country. But closer analysis shows that a very high proportion of imports are competitive with domestic production and that there is, therefore, considerable scope for the transfer of resources from export production to import substitution. In addition, a proportion of noncompetitive imports can also be produced locally; production of some such items has started since U.D.I. Thus the scale of imports can be drastically reduced, and while Zambia unwillingly and South Africa willingly continue to take a proportion of Rhodesia's traditional exports, Rhodesia will be able to acquire sufficient foreign exchange to pay for essential imports.

Moreover, it has to be remembered that the overall size of the Rhodesian economy is small and relatively insignificant amounts of trade are involved. Thus, only small operations are needed to prevent sanctions from becoming crippling. There are groups in the United States, in West Germany (which is not a member of the United Nations), and in other Western countries that are known to oppose sanctions, and it is difficult to believe that individuals will not be found who are willing and able to circumvent the United Nations resolution.

Nor are the social problems arising from reduced economic activity particularly acute. As they have been in the past, unemployed Africans can be left to fend for themselves in the rural areas, where it is possible to eke out some kind of living. To some extent, Europeans can be absorbed into the administrative machine and into police and army reserves; ease of emigration to South Africa provides another outlet. On balance, therefore, it would seem that, with South African support, Rhodesia can withstand sanctions for several years if not indefinitely. In fact, it may well prove that fundamental change will not occur in Rhodesia until it also occurs in South Africa.

ERRATUM: We regret that the date for the withdrawal of certain Soviet claims in Turkey was erroneously given as 1953 in "New Regime in Turkey," *Current History*, February, 1967, page 107, line 6. It should have read 1963.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See *United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Jan. 1—The EFTA becomes an “industrial free-trade area.”*

International Finance

Jan. 22—At a 24-hour conference in Britain, attended by delegates from the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, a communique is issued announcing a co-operative effort to promote easier and cheaper credit.

United Nations

(See also *Israel*)

Jan. 10—At a news conference, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant expresses doubt that South Vietnam is strategically essential to the free world's security.

Jan. 13—The chief delegates from Laos, the Philippines, Korea, Nationalist China, Japan, Thailand and the acting delegate of Malaysia meet with U.N. Secretary-General U Thant. They inform U Thant of their views that a friendly South Vietnam is essential to the security of Southeast Asia.

Jan. 15—U Thant tells the U.N. Security Council that he has sent appeals to Syria and Israel to reduce border tensions to help prevent “a large-scale clash.” U Thant proposes an emergency meeting of the

Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.

Jan. 16—The governments of Syria and Israel agree to a meeting of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel insists that the meeting be limited to a discussion of “practical arrangements” for the cultivation of land in the demilitarized zone along the Israeli-Syrian frontier.

Jan. 27—In Washington, D.C., 62 nations including the U.S. sign the treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space. Similar treaty-signing ceremonies are held in Moscow and London. The treaty awaits ratification. (For the complete text, see pp. 175 ff. of this issue.)

War in Vietnam

Jan. 1—In a radio broadcast, the National Liberation Front declares that the Vietcong will observe a 7-day ceasefire during the Lunar New Year in February.

Jan. 2—U.S. planes shoot down 7 MIG jets over North Vietnam in what is called “the largest air battle of the war.”

South Vietnam announces that it is willing to attend a peace conference on British territory.

Jan. 3—In an interview in Hanoi with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Harrison Salisbury, assistant managing editor of *The New York Times*, reports that the premier has described Hanoi's 4-point program for peace talks as offering a “basis of settlement of the Vietnam problem” and not as a condition for talks.

Jan. 4—The North Vietnamese foreign ministry issues a statement rejecting Britain's proposal for a Vietnam peace conference because Britain did not plan to include the National Liberation Front.

* Erratum: We regret that our February, 1967, issue erroneously dated this event, which occurred at midnight, December 31, 1966.

Jan. 5—In a talk to French and foreign correspondents in Paris, Mai Van Bo, head of the North Vietnamese general delegation in France, declares that North Vietnam would consider U.S. peace talk proposals if bombing is halted.

A U.S. State Department spokesman declares that the U.S. will halt the bombings when it is "assured, privately or otherwise, that this step would be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side."

Jan. 6—The North Vietnam government issues an official statement to dispel speculation over Phan Van Dong's remarks to Harrison Salisbury. It declares that "the four-point stand of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam constitutes the basis of a settlement of the Vietnamese problem."

Jan. 13—General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announces that the U.S. will not at this time strike at 4 North Vietnamese airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. General Wheeler reports to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on his week's inspection tour of Vietnam.

Jan. 18—A U.S. military spokesman reports that B-52 bombers have dropped magnesium incendiary bombs on a forested area in War Zone D in South Vietnam to defoliate it.

Jan. 23—Three clergymen return to London from a 10-day visit to North Vietnam. They report that President Ho Chi Minh has invited U.S. President Johnson to Hanoi for peace talks.

Jan. 25—Diplomatic sources in Washington report that the U.S. has contacted Vietnamese representatives informally but that so far nothing has materialized.

It is reported in Washington that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recently issued an order forbidding U.S. planes to attack within a 5-mile radius of the center of Hanoi; other bombing restrictions are also issued.

Jan. 30—Total U.S. strength in Vietnam reaches 404,000 men.

BELGIUM

Jan. 24—Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, in a speech before the Belgian-American Society in Brussels, expresses hope for a nonaggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

BRAZIL

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 22—A new constitution is approved; Brazil will become a federal republic under a strong president.

CHILE

Jan. 17—The Chilean senate defeats an enabling bill that would have allowed President Eduardo Frei Montalva to make a visit to the U.S. next month.

CHINA (Nationalist)

Jan. 13—Four Chinese Nationalist planes clash with 12 Communist Chinese MIG jets northeast of Quemoy. Nationalist China declares that 2 Communist Chinese planes were shot down.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *Vatican*)

Jan. 6—Japanese correspondents in Peking report that Red Guard wall posters in Peking state that, in 1958, Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung was forced to step down as chairman of the People's Republic (president) at the insistence of a group headed by Liu Shao-chi, now chairman of the republic.

Jan. 7—Japan's Kyodo news service reports that Red Guard posters in Peking have disclosed that 54 persons were killed, 900 wounded and 6,000 arrested in clashes between Red Guards and workers opposing them in Nanking last Tuesday, Thursday and Friday.

Jan. 11—It is reported that Po I-po, a leading Chinese economic planner, was arrested on January 3 by Red Guards.

It is reported from Hong Kong that *Hsinhua* (official press agency) has warned that the Communist Party Municipal Committee in Shanghai (China's largest city) may be purged. The Shanghai Municipal Committee is charged with having used party funds to keep workers and students from supporting the purge of Mao's enemies. *Hsinhua* transmits a message, supposedly signed by the party's Central Committee, the party Military Commission and the Cultural Revolution Committee, urging the Chinese people to study events in Shanghai and to fight "the bourgeois reactionary mind."

Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping and Liu Shao-chi are among the most important targets of Red Guard poster attacks, according to reports from Hong Kong.

Jan. 12—Mao and Defense Minister Lin Piao reorganize the committee in charge of the "cultural revolution" in the army. Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, is named adviser to the committee for the army.

The Peking radio reports that groups loyal to the Mao-Lin faction have gained control of the Shanghai railway administration and the Yangtsepoo electric power plant after several days of conflict.

Jan. 14—A Japanese correspondent in Peking reports that Liu has asked to withdraw a statement of "self-criticism" he made in October, 1966, at a Chinese Communist Party meeting.

Jan. 19—Reports from Hong Kong indicate that Red Guards have seized control of the headquarters of the Municipal Committee in Peking.

Jan. 20—It is reported that Lo Jui-ching, purged chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, has committed suicide.

Jan. 23—*Agence France-Presse* in Peking reports that Peking posters carry a directive dated January 22, signed by Red Guards and attributed to Mao, ordering the army to support the Red Guards.

According to Japanese reports, the Chinese army has taken over the Peking suburb

of Fangshan, an anti-Maoist opposition center. This marks the first time army troops have been used during the present political disturbances.

Jan. 25—According to Japanese reports of Peking wall posters, the Chinese army is supporting pro-Mao elements in Manchuria and Anhwei Province. In Inner Mongolia, close to the Soviet border, and in Sinkiang (where the nuclear testing grounds are located), the army is reported backing the anti-Maoists.

Jan. 27—In an article in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (Chinese Communist Party newspaper) Russian leaders are called "Soviet revisionist swine." It is reported that China has protested to the Soviet Union over the clash between Communist Chinese students and Soviet citizens in Moscow on January 25.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

Jan. 15—The cabinet decides not to seize the property of the Société Générale (the Belgian holding and investment company), but decrees the confiscation of all property in the Congo held by the Société Générale's subsidiary, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, and revokes Union Minière mining concessions in the Congo. (See also *Congo, Current History*, February, 1967, page 120.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jan. 30—Vladimir Kazan-Komarek, a U.S. citizen of Czech origin, goes on trial for treason in Prague. He was seized while traveling on a Soviet airliner that made an unscheduled landing in Czechoslovakia.

FRANCE

(See also *Poland; United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

Jan. 13—On a 2-day visit to France, West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger tells President Charles de Gaulle that Germany wants to restore good relations with France.

Jan. 14—German sources report that, during talks between Kiesinger and de Gaulle, France and West Germany have agreed to coordinate their policies toward East Europe.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *France; Poland; U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 5—West Germany's central bank, the *Bundesbank*, cuts its discount rate from 5 to 4.5 per cent, effective Jan. 6.

Jan. 12—It is disclosed that at a cabinet meeting yesterday, it was decided to lift import restrictions on goods from East Europe.

Jan. 31—In Bonn, West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu sign an agreement to open full diplomatic ties.

GREECE

Jan. 14—Parliament gives a vote of confidence to Premier Ioannis Paraskevopoulos' cabinet.

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 22—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi admits that India has accepted certain U.S. conditions for receiving American grain shipments to alleviate the present famine.

Goa

Jan. 18—The results of a poll of January 16 are reported: the people of Goa have voted against joining India's Maharashtra state and in favor of remaining a self-governing "union territory." The Indian parliament is not bound by the results of the poll.

INDONESIA

Jan. 10—President Sukarno, in a statement sent to the Provisional People's Consultative Congress, declares that he was in no way responsible for the Communist attempt to overthrow the government in 1965.

Jan. 12—It is announced that a congressional

inquiry will investigate President Sukarno's activities at the time of the October, 1965, Communist coup.

Jan. 20—Leaders of the congress announce that the congress will meet in March or April, 1967, to consider President Sukarno's tenure.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Jan. 6—Israel tells the U.N. truce supervisory organization that Syrian tanks have fired across the Israeli border.

Jan. 8—Near the Sea of Galilee, Syrians and Israelis fire on one another. It is the fifth clash in the area since January 1.

Jan. 25—At an "extraordinary" meeting of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, U.N., Syrian and Israeli delegates confer. Israel and Syria reaffirm their 17-year-old nonaggression pledge.

ITALY

Jan. 25—Visiting Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny talks with President Giuseppe Saragat.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 30—It is reported that Premier Eisaku Sato's Liberal Democrats have won 277 of the 486 seats in parliament in the national elections for the House of Representatives on January 29.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Jan. 21—At a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, the head of the U.N. Command and the North Korean representative each accuse the other side of violating the armistice. On January 19, a South Korean navy patrol boat 2 miles north of the demarcation line and 5 miles offshore was sunk by North Korean guns.

LAOS

Jan. 1—Elections for a new 59-member parliament are held. There are no parties and

no election issues. The pro-Communist Pathet Lao boycotts the election.

Jan. 6—It is reported that Premier Souvanna Phouma and other leaders supporting him will be able to count on 30 of the 59 votes in the National Assembly.

LESOTHO

Jan. 5—Under "custody" since Dec. 28, King Moshoeshoe II signs a document allowing the government to control his actions and providing for his automatic abdication if he oversteps his authority.

Jan. 6—King Moshoeshoe II is released.

NICARAGUA

Jan. 22—In Managua, an antigovernment demonstration is followed by rioting. In clashes with national guard troops, at least 21 persons are killed and over 100 are wounded.

Jan. 23—The revolt is ended.

Jan. 24—The government closes 3 opposition radio stations and a newspaper.

Jan. 25—Fighting erupts in Managua between partisans and national guardsmen.

NIGERIA

Jan. 6—A 2-day constitutional conference in Accra, attended by the chairman of the federal military council, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, and the 4 regional governors of Nigeria, ends. Gowon asserts that "Nigeria will definitely remain united."

Jan. 10—It is announced that 3 persons were killed during week-long riots in Nigeria's Eastern region.

Jan. 14—The Nigerian government announces officially that Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed during the July, 1966, coup.

POLAND

Jan. 27—Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki addresses diplomatic correspondents in Paris after 2 days of talks with French President de Gaulle and other French leaders. He declares that West Germany must

recognize the Oder-Neisse as its permanent eastern frontier.

PORTUGAL

Angola

Jan. 6—A military communique from Lisbon reports that Portuguese troops killed 243 Angolan rebels at Teixeira de Sousa near the border of the Congo (Kinshasa).

Macao

Jan. 29—The governor of Macao and a Communist Chinese delegation sign an accord acceding to Chinese demands and ending the 7-week crisis.

RHODESIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

RUMANIA

(See *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

SAUDI ARABIA

Jan. 27—A Saudi defense ministry communique reports that 10 U.A.R. jets have raided Najran (a Saudi Arabian town near the Yemeni border). The U.A.R. has charged that Najran is a base from which Yemeni royalists operate.

SPAIN

Jan. 2—Six jailed labor leaders (held since December 31) are released following a sit-down strike by 13,000 workers in 4 electronics plants in Madrid.

Jan. 5—Spain and Rumania sign an agreement to set up full consular and commercial relations.

Jan. 30—At the University of Madrid, police using clubs and water jets battle student demonstrators protesting the arrests of students and workers during a January 27 demonstration against rising prices and in favor of free labor unions.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, U.N.; Israel*)

TOGO

Jan. 13—The Togo radio announces that an army coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Eyadema has overthrown President Nicolas Grunitzky. Eyadema declares a state of emergency, suspends the constitution and national assembly, and bans all political parties.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *China; Vatican; Yugoslavia*)

Jan. 20—The U.S.S.R. and Japan sign an agreement setting up commercial flights between Tokyo and Moscow. The Japan Air Lines and the Soviet Union's Aeroflot will jointly operate the air service.

Jan. 24—Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny arrives in Rome for an official visit.

Jan. 29—The Soviet Union delivers messages to the U.S., French, British and West German embassies warning that "the Nazi spirit" has reappeared in West Germany.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Saudi Arabia*)

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Jan. 15—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary George Brown fly to Italy to discuss possible British entry into the European Economic Community.

Jan. 16—Italian Premier Aldo Moro tells Wilson that Italy will endorse British membership in the Common Market.

The British and French defense ministers agree to cooperate in the development of a supersonic military jet plane.

Jan. 17—The leader of the Liberal Party, Jo Grimond, resigns.

Jan. 18—Jeremy Thorpe is elected Liberal Party leader.

Jan. 24—In "exploratory" discussions in Paris, Wilson talks with French President Charles de Gaulle on British entry into the E.E.C.

Jan. 26—On the third and final reading, the House of Commons votes to renationalize the steel industry.

The Bank of England reduces its bank rate to 6.5 per cent from 7 per cent.

BRITISH TERRITORIES

Bahamas

Jan. 14—It is announced that Lynden O. Pindling, leader of the Progressive Liberal Party, has been asked to form a government.

Jan. 16—The first all-Negro government, under Pindling, is sworn in.

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

Jan. 12—A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, announces that he will call a "Negro summit conference" because of Congress' attack on Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D.-N.Y.), which he terms "the greatest crisis in Negro-white relations." (See *U.S., Government*.)

Jan. 22—Randolph postpones plans for a "summit" meeting concerning Powell.

Jan. 26—In Port Gibson, Mississippi, it is announced that a 10-month boycott of white businesses will end tomorrow. The white community has acceded to several Negro demands.

Economy

Jan. 9—Commissioner of Labor Statistics Arthur M. Ross declares that unemployment in 1966 averaged 3.9 per cent of the labor force, under 4 per cent for the first time since 1953.

Jan. 11—The Federal Home Loan Bank Board announces that the interest rate on its loans to savings and loan associations will be cut from 6 per cent to 5.75 per cent, to ease mortgage credit.

Jan. 12—Four aluminum companies raise their prices. Gardner Ackley, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, declares that "none of the increases was necessary. . . ."

Trading on the New York Stock Exchange reaches a volume of 13.23 million shares, the third largest turnover in the history of the Exchange.

Jan. 15—The Commerce Department reports that preliminary figures on the gross national product indicate that in 1966 the GNP reached \$739.5 billion (8.5 per cent over 1965). Because prices in 1966 rose about 3 per cent over 1965, real growth is estimated at 5.4 per cent.

Jan. 20—Commissioner Ross reports that consumer prices in 1966 rose 3.3 per cent, the largest increase since 1957.

Jan. 26—Congress receives the President's economic report and the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers. President Lyndon Johnson predicts continued prosperity. The 3.2 per cent guidelines for noninflationary wage increases are abandoned for a more flexible approach to inflation. The Council calls on producers to try to absorb any cost increases without raising prices and, if possible, to reduce prices.

The Chase Manhattan Bank (the second largest commercial bank in the U.S.) announces that it has reduced its prime interest rate to 5.5 per cent from 6 per cent.

Jan. 27—It is reported that most of the large banks in the country have dropped their prime interest rates from 6 per cent to 5.75 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam; Yugoslavia*)

Jan. 4—British and other foreign car manufacturers have notified the National Traffic Safety Agency that they will not be able to meet all the proposed automobile safety standards in their 1968 models for export to the U.S.

Jan. 5—President Johnson signs an executive order halting trade with Rhodesia in compliance with the U.N. imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. (See *U.N., Current History*, February, 1967, page 118.)

Jan. 11—The new U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn E. Thompson, arrives in Moscow with a special message for Soviet leaders from President Johnson.

Jan. 14—U.S. officials disclose that the President's message appealed to the Soviet

Union to halt deployment of an antimissile defense system.

President Johnson orders Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow to organize an international aid-to-India consortium to help India meet its recurring food shortages. Rostow will visit India and 7 other nations.

Jan. 20—State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey discloses that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin have met several times recently to discuss the proposal to halt deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

Jan. 23—Rusk testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and urges ratification of the consular convention with the U.S.S.R. Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-S. Dak.) reads a letter from F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover declaring that Soviet consulates in the U.S. would increase "Soviet-directed espionage activities in this country. . . ."

Jan. 25—U.S. Ambassador to Poland John A. Gronouski, after meeting in Warsaw with the Communist Chinese Ambassador Wang Kuo-chang, announces that Wang has refused to meet him again until their scheduled June, 1967, meeting.

Jan. 26—In a letter to President Johnson, 50 U.S. Rhodes scholars at Oxford University question U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Johnson meets with President-elect of Brazil Arthur Costa e Silva, who is on a 7-day visit to the U.S.

Government

(See also *Economy*)

Jan. 2—President Johnson ends a 17-day holiday at the LBJ ranch in Texas; he leaves for Washington.

Jan. 3—Jack Ruby dies while serving a prison sentence. Ruby shot and killed Lee Harvey Oswald, officially designated assassin of President John F. Kennedy.

The Ford Motor Company, the Chrysler Corporation, and the American Motors Corporation inform William Haddon, Jr., administrator of the National Traffic Safety

Agency, that they will not be able to meet between 6 and 10 of the federal government's tentative 23 safety standards for 1968 models.

The House Administration Committee charges Adam Clayton Powell with misuse of public funds.

Jan. 4—The Justice Department, in a memorandum filed in the Supreme Court by U.S. Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, concedes that the loyalty oath provision of the Medicare law is not constitutional.

Jan. 5—It is announced that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester will resign February 3. Phil G. Goulding, the deputy assistant secretary for public affairs, will succeed him.

The State Department announces that it is no longer necessary for passport applicants to sign an oath of allegiance.

Jan. 6—It is reported that yesterday, at the request of the government, federal courts in New York and Washington dismissed indictments against Judith Coplon in a 17-year-old espionage case.

Jan. 9—Meeting in caucus, House Democrats vote to remove Adam Clayton Powell as chairman of the Education and Labor Committee.

Jan. 10—The 90th Congress opens. In the House, Republicans and southern Democrats vote, 232-185, to eliminate the 21-day rule that prevents the Rules Committee from holding up legislation.

The House of Representatives votes not to seat Adam Clayton Powell until a select committee investigates his qualifications. The committee must report within 5 weeks of its appointment. (See also *U.S., Civil Rights*.)

President Johnson delivers his State of the Union message to Congress. He asks for a 6 per cent surcharge on personal and corporate income taxes for 2 years to finance the Vietnamese war. He proposes increased social security benefits, an anti-crime program, and other domestic programs. He appeals to the Soviet Union to halt the development of its antimissile system "and thus avoid another costly spiral

in the arms race." He asks Americans to support the war in Vietnam.

The Georgia state legislature elects Lester G. Maddox (D.) governor.

Jan. 11—President Johnson reduces tariffs on watches and sheet glass, to benefit Switzerland and Belgium.

Jan. 12—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner announces that the federal government will halt support for welfare programs in Alabama on February 28 unless Alabama's state welfare agency gives assurances of compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Jan. 16—The first secretary of the new Department of Transportation, Alan S. Boyd, is sworn in.

Jan. 18—The White House announces the impending resignation of Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor.

Jan. 19—The 9-man House committee (5 Democrats and 4 Republicans) to investigate the qualifications of Adam Clayton Powell is named; Emanuel Celler (D., N.Y.) is appointed chairman.

Jan. 23—In a special "Message on Older Americans," President Johnson asks Congress for an increase in social security benefits, ranging from 15 per cent to 59 per cent, to be financed by increasing payroll taxes; he requests other benefits for the elderly and disabled.

Jan. 24—President Johnson sends his budget message to Congress. In his "national income accounts" budget, estimated expenditures total \$169.2 billion, up \$15.6 billion, and estimated receipts total \$167.1 billion, up \$17.3 billion, for fiscal 1968. Defense spending is set at \$73.1 billion, the third highest defense budget in history.

A resolution to change the Senate rule requiring a two-thirds vote of those present and voting to cut off debate (cloture) is defeated.

Jan. 29—In a federal district court in Washington, D.C., Robert G. Baker is convicted of larceny and income tax evasion.

Jan. 30—In a special message to Congress, entitled "Protecting Our Natural Heri-

tage," President Johnson urges Congress to authorize the federal government to regulate air pollution. Under the proposed Air Quality Act of 1967, states will be encouraged to develop regional programs to combat air pollution.

Jan. 31—The National Traffic Safety Agency adopts 20 federal standards providing for safety devices or features on autos, trucks, buses and motorcycles.

In a message to Congress, President Johnson proposes to give \$250 million annually in increased benefits to servicemen, veterans and civilians in war zones.

Labor

Jan. 17—At a meeting in Tucson, Arizona, 200 delegates of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers vote to affiliate with the United Steelworkers of America, A.F.L.-C.I.O. In 1950, the union was expelled from the C.I.O. because of its alleged communist ties.

Jan. 25—The Chrysler Corporation announces that it is cutting back production in 4 assembly plants; 13,900 workers will be laid off. The General Motors Corporation also announces that it will trim its production at 3 assembly plants and will lay off 1,900 workers.

Military

Jan. 17—President Johnson declares that he will ask for a supplemental appropriation of \$9.4 billion from Congress to finance military costs for the fiscal year ending June 30.

Jan. 19—At a press conference, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announces plans to consolidate, reduce or eliminate 39 military bases and other operations in the U.S. and abroad. An annual savings of \$47.4 million will be realized.

Jan. 20—McNamara releases \$564 million for military construction purposes; his December 21, 1965, order halting \$620 million in construction is rescinded.

Jan. 26—McNamara tells Congress that China might be able to test an intercontinental ballistic missile this year. However,

China is not expected to be able to deploy operational ICBM's before the middle of the 1970's.

It is reported that Major General Jerry D. Page has been removed as commandant of the Air War College. During a secret seminar at the War College for Reserve Officers in December, 1966, Page discussed bomb shortages in Vietnam and the security policies of the Johnson administration.

Politics

Jan. 11—*The New York Times* reports that President Johnson has asked Democratic National Chairman John M. Bailey to remain on the job.

Jan. 14—Based on figures filed with the office of the House Clerk, it is reported that on the national level, Republicans spent \$7.6 million and the Democrats spent \$4.3 million in the 1966 election campaign.

Jan. 19—Outlining Republican views and policies in Republican "State of the Union" messages, Representative Gerald R. Ford (R.-Mich., House minority leader) and Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R.-Ill., Senate minority leader) address Republican members of Congress and their wives. Dirksen asserts that, in Vietnam, we must "make plain to the world that we mean business!"

Jan. 21—Republican national committee members and state chairmen attend a party strategy meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Press

Jan. 16—Mrs. John F. Kennedy withdraws her lawsuit to prevent publication of *The Death of a President* after its author, William Manchester, and its publisher, Harper and Row, agree to delete or modify passages offensive to Mrs. Kennedy.

Science and Space

Jan. 27—Virgil Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee, the three astronauts scheduled for the Apollo 1 mission, are killed in a flash fire in the cockpit of their spaceship

during a full-scale simulation of the planned February 21 launching.

Jan. 28—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces that due to the Apollo fire there will be a delay of at least 4 to 6 months in the space program. The length of the delay will depend on the findings of a 7-man board of inquiry, named today.

Supreme Court

Jan. 9—The Supreme Court declares, 7 to 2, that a Florida legislative reapportionment plan is unconstitutional. A redistricting law in Missouri is voided 7 to 2 and an Indiana congressional reapportionment law is invalidated 7 to 2. The decisions indicate that the Court may require the new districts to correspond more closely to the one man, one vote principle.

The Supreme Court rules, 5 to 4, in an invasion of privacy case brought by Mr. and Mrs. James J. Hill against Time, Inc., publisher of *Life* magazine, that "the constitutional protections for speech and press" are best preserved if the press enjoys immunity from liability in invasion of privacy suits brought by persons in the news.

Jan. 10—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that it is not a crime for a person with a current passport to travel to countries banned by the State Department. The Court declares that no criminal statute enjoins such travel. However, the government may still enforce a ban on travel to particular countries by canceling the passports of persons making unauthorized trips.

Jan. 23—The Supreme Court declares, 5 to 4, that a group of New York state laws designed to prevent subversives from being employed in New York's public schools or state colleges are unconstitutional because of vagueness or what it terms "an over-board sweep." Included in the laws found constitutionally inadequate is a loyalty oath requirement.

VATICAN, THE

Jan. 6—At a mass celebrated in St. Peter's

Basilica, Pope Paul VI declares that the church would like to "discuss peace" with the leaders of Communist China and to reestablish relations.

Jan. 30—Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny meets with Pope Paul VI in Rome.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Jan. 4—A cabinet decision made yesterday is announced: all French primary schools in South Vietnam will be closed and French secondary schools will close in 1973 when the last students complete their courses.

Jan. 18—Premier Nguyen Cao Ky arrives in Australia at the start of a 10-day trip to Australia and New Zealand.

Jan. 25—It is reported that Lieutenant General Nguyen Huu Co, deputy premier and defense and war minister, was ousted while visiting Nationalist China. Co, the last remaining "southerner" in the military junta, remains in Hong Kong rather than return to face arrest.

Jan. 27—The military junta names Lieutenant General Cao Van Vien defense minister.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 10—The Central Committee unanimously adopts a report opposing an international communist conference.

Jan. 28—President Tito arrives in the Soviet Union for a visit.

Jan. 29—All Yugoslav missions in Canada and the U.S., except for one in Pittsburgh, are damaged by coordinated bombings.

ZAMBIA

Jan. 1—President Kenneth D. Kaunda appoints a white Zambian, James J. Skinner, to serve as minister of legal affairs in his cabinet.

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